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Abstract
A sizeable academic literature has documented a positive effect of immigration
in promoting trade and investment between the host and the origin country. Using
province-level international exports data from Spain, I contribute to the migration-
trade link literature in three ways. First, I include a focus on emigration along with
immigration. Second, I integrate the latest methodological developments of the re-
search on gravity models in the analysis of the migration-trade link to address estima-
tion issues and potential functional form mis-specification in the previous literature.
Third, implications from the use of sub-national units for theory-consistent modelling
are discussed and made explicit. The results of the analysis lead to identify the Gamma
PML as the consistent and efficient estimator for the data at stake and to discard the
Poisson PML in spite of its growing popularity as a ”workhorse” in gravity models. The
estimates robustly confirm a positive and significant effect of province-level immigra-
tion stocks on the exports of Spanish provinces and highlight important sub-national
variation in the effects; the dynamics of the effects of emigration on trade, instead,
appear to be determined at the national level.
Jel classification: F10, F14, F22, C52
Keywords: Gravity model, immigration, emigration, network effect, subnational units,
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1 Introduction
The impact of migration flows on the host economies is a heatedly debated topic in politics
and social sciences. Most visible and documented at the level of employment, migration
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also importantly impacts at the level of the internationalization of the host economies.
A sizeable academic literature since Gould [1994] and Rauch and Trinidade [2002] has
documented a positive effect of immigration in promoting trade and investment between
the host and the origin country.
The analysis of the migration-trade link employs gravity models of international trade
where the stocks of immigrants, as a proxy for the size of the immigrant networks, are
interpreted as factors that reduce the informal barriers to trade between the origin and the
destination country. The developments in the theoretical foundations of the gravity model
have co-determined an evolution in the estimation methods employed for the analysis of
the migration-trade link; however, in spite of the strong case for the use of the Poisson
estimator in gravity models since the article by Santos-Silva and Tenreyro [2006], this
estimator has not found much prominence in the migration-trade link literature. The
reason is probably that, due to the specific problems at stake, recent papers in this strand
of the literature have been more interested in panel data than the more standard gravity
literature, which has focussed very much on determinants of trade that show less marked
time variation such as trade agreements, currency unions, borders and distance; theory
consistent estimation by panel data involves the use of three sets of dummies (time-varying
importer effects; time-varying exporter effects; and dyadic time-invariant effects), which
increases very much the computational difficulty of estimating gravity models by Poisson1.
Thus, the first contribution of this paper to the literature is methodological: drawing on the
options proposed by Head and Mayer [2014] as a guidance for ”exploring the robustness”
of the OLS, Poisson and Gamma estimates, I explore the estimation issues affecting each
estimator, such as heterogeneity, incidental parameters problem and heteroskedasticity, as
well as the potential functional form mis-specification in the migration variables. No single
estimator emerges as free from estimation issues. Based on the application of the tests
proposed in Manning and Mullahy [2001] and Santos-Silva and Tenreyro [2006], the OLS
and Gamma estimators appear more appropriate for the specific data at stake.
The second contribution relates to the specific migration history of Spain: building on
the intuition by Murat and Pistoiesi [2009] that the arguments on the migration-trade
link could be applied to emigration as well as to immigration, I include the analysis of
emigration within theory-consistent modelling of the migration-trade link.
A third contribution is associated with the focus on subnational units of analysis, which is
not novel per se but rather in the way its implications for theory-consistent modelling are
discussed and made explicit.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 I present the theoretical framework on
gravity models and on the migration-trade link, I run a survey of the literature of closest
1In practice, obtaining Poisson estimates in specifications including a large number of fixed effects may
be impossible, as noted among other by Bratti et al. [2012], due to serious convergence problems.
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relevance to this paper and I outline a few hypotheses with respect to the effects of immi-
gration and emigration on trade. In section 3 I describe the dataset. In section 4 I define
the econometric strategy applied to address the hypotheses. In section 5 I present the main
results and open issues arising from the econometric analysis. Section 6 concludes.
2 Theoretical framework
The literature on the migration-trade link can be seen as a subset of a wider international
trade literature applying “augmented” gravity models. The literature on gravity models
has seen a considerable development in the last two decades, especially as far as the theo-
retical foundations of the model are concerned [Head and Mayer, 2014]. The turning point
in the theoretical micro-foundations of the gravity model is the theoretical derivation of the
”multilateral resistance term” by Anderson and van Wincoop [2003], which led to obsoles-
cence of previous works applying the gravity model omitting this term. On this ground,
Baldwin and Taglioni [2007] have established three common mistakes of the literature on
gravity, what they term the ”gold”, ”silver” and ”bronze-medal mistakes”. Because the
literature investigating the effects of migration on trade has closely followed the develop-
ments in the gravity theory, it is possible to run a critical review of this literature in the
light of the developments in gravity theory. Before starting, however, I will give a brief
introduction to the gravity model.
2.1 The Gravity Model
Introductory paragraphs on gravity models often start from the statement that the gravity
model is one of the few examples of law-like behaviours in social sciences: bilateral trade is
proportional to the economic ”masses” of the trading countries and inversely proportional
to their bilateral trade barriers, primarily distance. Figure 1 shows an instance of this:
gravity applies to the trade of the province of Madrid with EU countries in 2008.
In Fig. 1, the log of the exports of the province of Madrid to EU countries are plotted
against the GDPs of these countries divided by the bilateral distance. The idea is that the
EU is a sufficiently homogeneous subset of countries from the institutional point of view to
reduce the bias from omitted variables. The slope of the regression line, which results from
the simple regression of the log of the exports on the log of the ratio of GDP to distance,
is 1.00051, and most observations lie reasonably close to it. The proportionality of the
GDPs and the inverse proportionality of distance to exports confirm the analogy with the
physics law of gravitation with the exception, which is common in the trade literature, that
distance is not squared. The gravity equation directly deriving from the physics analogy,
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Figure 1: Gravity and the trade of the province of Madrid (EU countries)
empirically driven, and not theoretically micro-founded was first noted by Tinbergen [1962];
in their review, Head and Mayer [2014] call it the ”na¨ıve” gravity equation:
Xni = GY
a
n Y
b
i φni (1)
In Head and Mayer’s notation, Xni is the volume of trade between country n (importing
country) and country i (exporting country); Yi represents the ”mass” of production of
exporting country, Yn represents the ”mass” of expenditures of the importing country, G
is a constant, and a and b are parameters to be estimated which do not necessarily equal
1 (even if empirically they are often close to this value). The term φni represents the
transaction costs of bilateral trade; it includes natural trade barriers such as distance but
also other barriers such as tariffs, as well as their respective elasticities.
The theoretical foundations given to the gravity model in Anderson and van Wincoop
[2003], building on Anderson [1979] made it clear that the na¨ıve version of the equation
was lacking a “multilateral resistance term”. While the Anderson-Van Wincoop model
is, by now, just one of the many compatible with what Head and Mayer [2014] call the
“structural form” of the gravity equation, their derivation is useful to understand the
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meaning of the multilateral resistance terms. The Anderson-Van Wincoop model is derived
in a general-equilibrium framework, where goods are differentiated by place of origin and
each country produces only one good; preferences are approximated by a CES utility
function, which consumers maximize under a standard budget constraint. Within the
bundle of each consumer there are foreign-country products, whose price varies by country
because of trade costs. The nominal demand for region i goods by region n consumers
thus depends among other on trade costs between the two countries and on the price index
in n. Assuming market clearance (and solving for the scaled prices), Anderson and Van
Wincoop are able to derive an imports demand function that is analogous to what Head
and Mayer [2014] label the ”structural form” of the gravity model (see equation 4):
Xni =
ynyi
yw
(
tni
ΠiPn
)1−σ
(2)
In this equation, the income terms are expressed as income shares of world income ynyiyw
rather than as country income, Pn is the consumer price index of importing country n
and Πi is an exporter-specific term that is a function of all bilateral trade barriers and
world income shares of its trade partners, tni are transport costs and σ is the elasticity
of substitution between goods produced in different countries. Assuming symmetric trade
barriers, both Πi and Pn become price indices terms expressed as functions of all bilateral
trade barriers and world income shares of each partner country. The gravity equation
expressed in this way is the following:
Xni =
ynyi
yw
(
tni
PiPn
)1−σ
(3)
The term
(
1
PiPn
)1−σ
, which constitutes the main difference from the “na¨ıve” version of
the gravity equation, is called the “multilateral resistance term”. The intuition is that
bilateral trade depends on economic masses and relative trade barriers
(
tni
PiPn
)1−σ
; thus,
changes in bilateral trade costs influence trade between two countries to the extent that
the change in bilateral costs is greater than the change in the average trade barriers of each
country towards all its partner countries (Anderson and van Wincoop [2003]: 176). In this
framework, assuming for example a uniform rise in trade barriers, two smaller countries
which are very open to trade will face a larger effect on their multilateral resistance, and
a smaller effect on their bilateral trade, than two larger countries: barriers will rise for
all trade transactions of the small countries with the rest of the world, and because these
make up an important part of the price indexes of the small countries, the multilateral
resistance will increase. Because of the change in the multilateral resistance term, the
bilateral change in trade barriers will be relatively unimportant and thus bilateral trade
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will not be much affected. On the contrary, larger countries for which the internal market
is more important will see a relatively weaker effect of the increase in trade barriers on the
internal price levels and thus on the multilateral resistance terms. Therefore, the bilateral
increase in trade barriers with a given partner will have a bigger effect on bilateral trade
because of the relatively smaller change occurred in the multilateral resistance term.
While the authors express the multilateral resistance through price indices in their model,
they warn that the multilateral resistance terms should be considered in a wider sense
to include non-pecuniary costs of trade and non-traded goods, which all contribute to
explaining price differentials across countries and regions. This makes the multilateral
resistance term unobservable, while part of it can be expressed by observables such as
distance, income shares, tariffs, etc. For this reason, since Anderson and Van Wincoop,
analysts no longer include GDP deflators into the gravity equation and rather resort to
fixed effects.
A more general way of expressing Anderson-Van Wincoop’s equation, abstracting from the
general-equilibrium framework and from the assumption of symmetry in trade costs, is
referred to by Head and Mayer [2014] as the “structural” gravity equation:
Xni =
Yi
Ωi
Xn
Φn
φni (4)
Where the trade cost term φni includes bilateral costs as well as their elasticities of substi-
tution, and the multilateral resistance term corresponds to (ΩiΦn)
−1. In turn,
Ωi = Σl
φliXl
Φl
and Φn = Σl
φnlYl
Ωl
. (5)
It has been shown that the factors composing the multilateral resistance terms can be
interpreted as, respectively, the average market access available to the exporting country
(Ωi) and the degree of competition in the importing country (Φn). More precisely, Ωi
represents the “expenditure-weighted average of relative access” and Φn the “accessibility-
weighted sum of exporters’ capabilities” ([Head and Mayer, 2014]: 9-10).
Thus, the total exporting capacity Si of country i depends on its total supply Yi and on
the average market access available to it, Ωi, which is a function of all other bilateral cost
terms, the expenditure in all other countries, and the degree of competition in all other
countries. The total importing capacity Mn of country n depends on its expenditures Xn
and on the degree of competition in its market Φn. The actual trade between i and n
depends ultimately on the two ”monadic” terms Si and Mn and on bilateral trade barriers
φni.
This is the logic underlying the third and last definition of the gravity equation, that of
”general gravity”:
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Xni = GSiMnφni (6)
In this definition, the expenditure and multilateral resistance terms of each trading partner
are captured in a unique ”monadic” term expressing the capacity of importing and of
exporting of the two partners. This way of expressing the gravity equation makes it clearer
why the recent literature captures both country expenditures (or supply) and multilateral
resistance terms with fixed effects.
A variety of demand-side and supply-side models of international trade, including among
other the Dixit-Stiglitz-Krugman monopolistic competition assumptions, Eaton and Kor-
tum [2002], Helpman et al. [2008] and Chaney [2008], are compatible with the “structural”
form of the gravity equation, and a number of other studies are compatible with its ”gen-
eral” form. For a detailed review, see Head and Mayer [2014]2.
Baldwin and Taglioni [2007] notice that, with panel and time-series data, the multilateral
resistance term depends on time-varying bilateral trade costs and on time-varying eco-
nomic masses. Thus, it introduces an “un-constant” in the model, whose time variation
should be accounted for in the empirical estimation. This bears important implications
for empirical estimation: with cross-section data, a (usually) straightforward way to ac-
count for the multilateral resistance term is the inclusion of importer and importer fixed
effects Anderson and van Wincoop [2003], Feenstra [2004], Redding and Venables [2004],
Hummels [1999]. In a panel context, Baldwin and Taglioni [2007] argue that the time
variation in the multilateral resistance terms should be coupled with importer-time and
exporter-time effects, while the correlation between the unobservable component of the
bilateral trade determinants and the included trade determinants should be accounted for
by time-invariante pair effects. Omitting these terms introduces a substantial bias in the
estimation and is referred to as the “gold-medal mistake” of gravity literature by Baldwin
and Taglioni [2007]3.
In their Handbook chapter, Head and Mayer [2014], devote an entire section to the theory-
consistent estimation of gravity equations and apply different methods in a series of Mon-
2Head and Mayer [2014] notice that all models compatible with the structural gravity form share two
assumptions: one is market clearing on the export side; the second relates to the accounting identity by
which total imports of country n from country i must equal the share allocated to country i of total
expenditures in n: Xni = piniXn. The critical assumption is the multiplicative separability of pini as the
product of three terms: one capturing bilateral trade costs, one capturing the degree of competition in the
importing market (or multilateral resistance term for the exporter) and one capturing exporters’ capabilities
(such as total production).
3The silver-medal mistake, often found in papers that use the average of bilateral flows as the dependent
variable, relates to taking the log of the average of uni-directional flows rather than the average of the logs;
the bronze-medal mistake relates to the inappropriate deflation of nominal trade values by the country’s
aggregate price index: since there are global trends in inflation rates, inclusion of this term is likely to
create biases via spurious correlations.
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teCarlo simulation to identify the consistent one. Fixed effect estimation is the preferred
solution ”so long as there are no econometric issues”4.
2.2 The mechanism: immigrants’ contribution to trade
Within the “structural” gravity equation, migration stocks can be seen as one of the factors
that reduce the bilateral costs of trade. Co-ethnic networks can be seen as a factor that
reduces transaction costs related to information asymmetries and contract enforcement
costs in international trade [Rauch and Trinidade, 2002]. Since the seminal work by Gould
[1994], the literature on the US, UK and Canada has established a positive contribution of
immigrants to trade and investments towards their origin countries (for example Dunlevy
and Hutchinson, 1999, Wagner et al., 2002, Herander and Saavedra, 2005, Girma and Yu,
2002).
The reduction in information costs in bilateral trade attributable to immigrants and immi-
grant networks is generally referred to as the ”information effect”: it relies on the ”deep”
knowledge [Rauch, 2001] that immigrants have of their home country institutions, business
culture and markets. This allows them play the role of intermediaries, provide market in-
formation, identify suitable suppliers or clients. The “enforcement effect” in international
transactions relates to the contribution of community reputation mechanisms to ensure the
enforcement of contracts [Rauch and Trinidade, 2002, Gould, 1994]. These mechanisms as-
sume the activation of in-group social capital as a resource for business, in the sense of
the “bounded solidarity” and “enforceable trust” described by Portes and Sensenbrenner
[1993], that is generated by the relations of the community of co-ethnics with the host
society. These lead to members’ preferential access to in-group resources, to support by
other members of the community, and to increased predictability in transactions due to
shared norms.
The trade cost term φni in equations 4 and 6 can also be broadly construed to include the
4The other estimation methods they consider are: (i) Estimation of the multilateral resistance terms
through ”structurally iterated least squares”, a development of the non-linear least squares method used
in Anderson and van Wincoop [2003]; (ii) Ratio-type estimation, where the monadic terms are suppressed
algebraically thanks to the computation of export ratios of actual trade with either trade to self or with
reference partners. The tetrad” method proposed by Head et al. [2010] computes a ”ratio of ratios”. It
first divides the observed exports from country i to country n by the exports of exporter i to a reference
importer k; then it divides the exports to n from a reference exporter ` by the exports from ` to k. Finally,
the ratio of these two ratios must be computes. This way the monadic terms are eliminated; the trade cost
terms must be similarly ”tetraded”, and the standard errors must be clustered at the importer, exporter
and pair level. This methodology addresses the computational difficulty involved in fixed effects estimation
with dummy variables but may be sensitive to the selection of the reference country; (iii) Double-demeaning
of the variables, i.e. demeaning for the importer and exporter dimension, or combinations of de-meaning
and dummy variables, and ”Bonus vetus OLS”, proposed by Baier and Bergstrand [2009], where first-order
Taylor expansions of multilateral resistance terms are introduced in the specification.
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measure of trust proposed by Guiso et al. [2009], which they find to affect bilateral trade
in a significant way. Whether more sizeable immigration stocks affect the trust of the host
country towards their origin country in a positive or a negative way cannot be determined
a priori: Gould [1994], in his seminal work about the migration-trade link, argued that
immigrants contribute to the overall diffusion in the host country, both to natives and non-
natives, of information and knowledge about the institutions, business and language of the
origin countries, and this can be interpreted as a positive contribution to bilateral trust.
Hovewer, the social tensions that are in some cases associated with sizeable immigration
stocks can have the opposite effect. In addition, levels of trust may be substantially different
across sub-national units according to the size of the local immigrant communities.
Information and enforcement costs increase in the (cultural/institutional) distance between
the trading countries[Boisso and Ferrantino, 1997, Dunlevy, 2006]. It is also possible that,
in global trade transactions, the effect of somatic and genetic distance on bilateral trust
and thus on trade is ceteris paribus stronger that what found by Guiso et al. [2009] for
European countries. For these reasons, the effect of migration stocks on trade costs, and
ultimately on trade volumes, is likely to be stronger for more culturally and institutionally
distant trading pairs, as found in empirical studies by Girma and Yu [2002], Dunlevy [2006],
Murat and Pistoiesi [2009]. In this sense, according to Tadesse and White [2008], migrants
effectively offset the negative effects of cultural distance on exports5.
In a study on the migration-trade link based on Chaney [2008]’s model, Peri and Requena-
Silvente [2010] distinguish between fixed and variable costs of trade, arguing that immi-
grants are likely to affect both types of costs. Finding stronger evidence of the immigrants’
effect on the extensive than on the intensive margin, they argue that immigrants con-
tribute more to reducing the fixed costs of entering a foreign market than the variable
costs of trade.
Besides trade costs, migration influences trade also trough the preferences channel (i.e.,
with reference to equation 4, by directly increasing Xn rather than reducing φni). Since
Gould [1994], this effect is referred to as a “preference effect”, whereby immigrants affect
imports of their host countries: immigrants are more likely than natives to consume their
home country products and thus directly raise the demand for home country products
5Trade costs, in particular information costs, also have a diversified impact on different types of sectors
and goods, and immigrants have a stronger effect on the trade of goods that have more informational
content. Since Rauch and Trinidade [2002], many authors have found evidence of a stronger effect of
immigrant stocks on the trade of more differentiated goods. The underlying mechanism is that, while for
internationally homogeneous and reference-priced goods, price is conveying most of the relevant information
for trade, exchanges of differentiated goods require specific efforts to identify and promote the specific
features of the good and to match ”buyers and sellers in the characteristics space” Rauch and Trinidade
[2002]:117). The data used in this paper are not disaggregated by type of good and do not allow testing this
relationship. It is however an ubiquitous and established finding in the literature, which has been confirmed
by Peri and Requena-Silvente [2010] in the case of Spain on a slightly earlier time period, so it would not
be of particular interest to test it here.
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abroad.
Murat and Pistoiesi [2009] and Flisi and Murat [2011] have argued that the arguments on
the immigration-trade link can be reversed and applied to the cases of emigrant networks
in countries such as Italy and Spain that have long emigration experiences. These authors,
using country-level data on Italy and Spain, find supporting evidence to the hypothesis that
emigrants facilitate exports to their destination countries through the same information,
enforcement and taste effects described above; they also find the emigrants’ effect on trade
to be stronger than that of immigrants. However, their failure to include fixed effects at the
country level or any other controls for multilateral resistance makes them run into the “gold
medal mistake” of gravity estimation described by Baldwin and Taglioni [2007].
2.3 The unit of observation: province units
Looking at the effect of immigration on trade, one key issue to determine is the unit of
observation. In most countries, the immigrant population is quite unevenly distributed. In
Spain, this heterogeneity is substantial: Fig. 2 gives a hint on the geographic concentration
of the immigrant and emigrant population in Spanish provinces. As panel 2a shows, 60%
of the immigrant population is concentrated in seven of the 52 Spanish provinces: Madrid,
Barcelona, Alicante, Valencia, Malaga, Islas Baleares and Murcia. Eight “intermediate”
provinces account for a 20% of the immigrant population and the remaining 37 do not add
up to more than 20%. The emigrant population (panel 2b) is also mostly originating from
a few provinces: Madrid,A Corun˜a, Pontevedra, Barcelona, Asturias, Ourense, Santa Cruz
and Lugo account for almost 57% of the Spanish expatriates.
Taking national units of observation would lead to imply an unrealistically homogeneous
geographic distribution of the migrant population over the nation. Furthermore, the migra-
tion effect on trade depends on networks of individuals, families and enterprises in which
proximity plays a crucial role [Rauch, 1999]. For this reason, in this paper I will follow a
relevant strand of the migration-trade link literature that takes sub-national units of anal-
ysis such as provinces, federal states and departments Wagner et al., 2002, Herander and
Saavedra, 2005, Dunlevy, 2006, Bandyopadhyay et al., 2008, Peri and Requena-Silvente,
2010, Briant et al., 2009, Bratti et al., 2012). While the analysis of immigration based on
these units may be complicated by the high mobility of immigrants across sub-national
borders (Borjas [2003] and the availability of data on migrants’ characteristics radically
shrinks at this disaggregation level, properly accounting for the geographic distribution of
the immigrant population is deemed more important. Furthermore, for the available data,
the variation and number of observations increase sizably.
Applying gravity theory to subnational units is rather straightforward, if one applies the
argument in Head and Mayer [2014]: the exporting capacity Si in equation 6 and the
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(b)
Figure 2: Geographic concentration of the immigrant and emigrant population by province. Source:
Own elaboration on INE data.
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expenditure-weighted market access Ωi in equation 4 need not be equal across provinces;
they may vary because of, for instance, local-specific comparative advantages. Thus, by
cross-sectional data, the multilateral resistance term on the sub-national unit is to be sub-
stituted by, as relevant, province, department or county effects; in the case of Spanish data,
where exports are recorded by province of origin and country of destination, the argument
in Baldwin and Taglioni [2007] about the use of time-varying dummies and pair effects
to appropriately take account of the multilateral resistance term and of unobservables in
bilateral trade determinants leads the micro-founded set of effects to include province-
time, country-time and province-country effects. However, with the important exception
of Briant et al. [2009] who explicitly take account of the heterogeneity at the de´partement
level, empirical studies adopting sub-national units are often omitting an explicit reflec-
tion on whether the provincial units are to be treated as fully-fledged trading partners.
Instead, they seem to assume that the size disproportion between the average country
and the average province justifies neglecting the economic “mass” of the subnational unit
and its multilateral resistance. Wagner et al. [2002], for instance, do not add province
dummies in their pooled cross-section on Canadian provinces exports arguing that “the
special relationships that affect both trade and immigration likely occur politically at the
national level” (p. 514-515); Bandyopadhyay et al. [2008] and Peri and Requena-Silvente
[2010], using panel data on the exports of respectively US states and Spanish provinces
include province-country dummies and country-time dummies but arbitrarily impose a re-
striction on exporter-time effects to be all the same, without a specific reference to theory.
Peri and Requena-Silvente justify this by assuming that the wage levels across provinces
will be the same and will thus be included in simple time dummies. Considering that
within-country wage differences may be substantial and that the additional computational
burden from including exporter-time effects is limited, it seems reasonable to include this
set of dummies. As I will show below, the evidence on Spanish provinces shows that the
province-time effects are jointly significantly different from zero; yet they do not make a
big difference in terms of the point estimates of the variables of interest. Bratti et al.
[2012], on Italian province-level data, propose a mixed approach where exporter-time and
pair effects are included at the regional instead of the provincial level (as region-time and
region-country effects), but control for province-specific income and for bilateral distance
between provinces and countries of destination.
The trade cost term on sub-national units includes all the bilateral-specific factors that are
affecting trade between a given province and a given country, including distance, borders,
language commonality, trade agreements, (which clearly do not change from one province
to another), migration of people from one country to a province (the immigration variable
of this study), and from one province to one country (the emigration variable). Immigrants
and emigrants would affect trade through the same information, enforcement, trust and
demand mechanisms described above; clearly, however, different locations could benefit
differently from the trade-facilitation role of migrants based on the bilateral specificities,
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accounted for by the pair effect. In one of the specifications, I will address whether the
elasticity of trade to migration differs by region6.
In addition, the use of sub-national units provides some insights on whether the diffusion
of information within immigrants’ networks has a geographic dimension: Herander and
Saavedra [2005] and Bratti et al. [2012] find that province exports, on the whole, are much
more strongly affected by the stocks of immigrants residing within the province than by
those residing outside the province, supporting their hypothesis that geographic proximity
within the network of immigrants matters to trade. Herander and Saavedra [2005] also find
that provinces with a high concentration of immigrants from a certain nationality affect the
exports of provinces with lower levels of concentration, suggesting potential information
flows from high-concentration to low-concentration provinces.
2.4 Review of the empirical works on the migration-trade link on sub-
national units
In this section I will briefly review the empirical works on the migration-trade link that
use subnational units and are of highest relevance for this paper7.
Wagner et al. [2002] run an extensive review of the empirical work on the migration-trade
link and analyse the trade of 5 Canadian provinces with 160 countries in a pooled cross-
section running from 1992 to 1995. Based on the consideration that the inclusion of fixed
effects increases the “noise-to-information ratio” and biases estimates downward [Griliches,
1986], they opt for the inclusion of fixed effects at the country level but exploit the cross-
sectional variation at the province level. This allows them to control for time-invariant
factors that simultaneously affect trade and immigration and that could bias the estimates
of the immigration elasticities. This applies in particular to language commonality (in-
cluding minority languages) which they account for through a variable that captures the
probability that two randomly chosen individuals within a trading pair will speak the same
language. In their review, they note that, with the important exceptions of Gould [1994]
and Rauch and Trinidade [2002], most studies on the migration-trade link assume constant
elasticity of trade to immigration: this implies that a given increase in the immigrant stock
will lead to the same increase in bilateral trade regardless of the size of the immigration
stock. Noting a lack of theoretical foundations for more realistic diminishing returns on
trade from immigration, they develop a “random encounter” model. This is based on the
6in Table A.17 in the Appendix, I also report the results of a model where the elasticity of trade is
allowed to vary by province; however, the province-specific estimates rely on a relatively limited number of
observations and are to be interpreted carefully.
7Other works on the migration-trade link that use subnational units are Co et al. [2004], Bardhan and
Guhathakurta [2004] on US state exports and Combes et al. [2005]on the intra-national trade of 93 French
Departments.
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idea that there are two types of trading opportunities: the ”hard” and the ”easy” trading
opportunities; the facilitation of a migrant is required to grasp the ”hard” opportunities,
while the easy ones get exhausted. Because the ”hard” opportunities require skills and
knowledge, a given immigrant has a probability p of being able to facilitate the exchange.
Thus, the probability that at least one immigrant is able to facilitate the exchange is
1− (1− p)immini (7)
, which implies diminishing returns to immigration. The authors estimate their models
through the Heckman procedure and by MLE, and find evidence in support of the infor-
mation, enforcement and taste effects of immigrants on trade, and of diminishing returns
to immigration; their results show that the effect of language commonality is not significant
when immigration controls are included, leading them to conclude that the immigration
effect goes beyond a language effect.
Herander and Saavedra [2005] focus on US states trade with a focus on identifying the
role of geographic proximity in immigrants’ networks in promoting trade. Their data is
a pooled cross section on the exports of 50 US states and 36 countries, over 1993-1996,
where they admit they do not exploit the time dimension because of their interest in
time-invariant factors. They include controls for ancestry of the immigrant population,
skills, length of stay and quality of institutions. The latter is obtained by interacting the
immigration variable with a rule of law index based on Kaufmann et al. [1999]. Because
of the high number of zeros in their dependent variable, they use a threshold-Tobit model
based on Eaton and Tamura [1994], where the dependent variable is ln(Xni + δ) where
δ is a threshold to be estimated; they also compare their estimates with Powell [1984]’s
Least Absolute Deviation estimator to ensure spatial and serial correlation do not affect
the results. As mentioned above, they find that province exports, on the whole, are much
more strongly affected by the stocks of immigrants residing within the province than by
those residing outside the province, supporting their hypothesis that geographic proximity
within the network of immigrants matters to trade. Another finding is that provinces with
a high concentration of immigrants from a certain nationality seem to have an effect on the
exports of provinces with lower levels of concentration, suggesting informational spillover
effects. Their failure to include fixed effects makes them run into the “gold medal mistake”,
while the effect of time-invariant variables could, according to Cheng and Wall [2005], have
been accounted for by regressing the estimated dyadic effects on the time-invariant variables
of interest.
Dunlevy [2006] focuses on cross-sectional data on the trade of 50 US states trade to 87
countries in 1990 and, motivated by the high number of zeros in the dependent variable,
applies a Tobit model where the dependent variable is the log of exports plus one. His
focus is on whether immigration affects more strongly the trade of US states with weaker
institutions and more corruption, hypothesizing that immigrants’ “enforcement effect” sub-
stitutes for the weak institutional setting. He finds support in favour of this hypotheses
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and of a few other corollaries and includes in some specifications both country and province
effects.
Briant et al. [2009] analyse a pooled cross-section on the trade of 94 French de´partements
with 100 countries in 1999-2001. They explicitly account for the sub-national heterogeneity
by adding fixed effects at the de´partement level as well as country fixed effects. They also
account for the potential heteroskedasticity bias noted by Santos-Silva and Tenreyro [2006]
in log-linearised equations and run their estimates on the immigration effect on trade
using the two-step Negative Binomial procedure suggested in Head et al. [2010], besides
OLS. They address the potential endogeneity of trade to immigration by instrumenting
the immigration variable with the lagged values of the variables in 1990, 1982 and 1975
finding, however, that estimates are not importantly affected. Running separate regressions
on the trade of simple and complex products, based on Rauch [1999] classification, and
interacting their immigration variable with a rule of law index, on the export side they find
that immigrants matter to exporting all kinds of products, and more so when institutions
are weak; on the import side they find that immigrants matter to the trade of simple goods
only when institutions are weak, and to the trade of complex goods by higher institutional
quality.
Bandyopadhyay et al. [2008] are the first to employ panel data with subnational units,
using a panel on 51 US states exports to 29 countries in 1990 and 2000. They draw
on Cheng and Wall [2005] argument in favour of bilateral pair-specific fixed effects to
appropriately account for unobserved heterogeneity in gravity models, and apply their
methodology to sub-national units. They run panel regressions with pair-specific fixed
effects and country-time dummies. Their main contribution is in terms of showing that
country-specific elasticities of trade to immigration may substantially depart from the
elasticity measured for the full sample and are significant only for a subset of countries;
this leads the authors to infer that the impact of immigration on trade differs by ethnicity.
As mentioned, however, they omit a full reflection on the multilateral resistance. Rather
than as the way to include multilateral resistance controls in panel data recommended by
Baldwin and Taglioni [2007], fixed effects are included as a more handy way to account
for heterogeneity and country-specific macroeconomic changes; the inclusion of state-time
effects is completely neglected.
Peri and Requena-Silvente [2010] use a panel on province-level exports of 50 Spanish
provinces to 77 countries in the 1995-2007 period. They derive from the Chaney [2008]
model a specification that is similar to the one used by Bandyopadhyay et al. [2008]; draw-
ing on Chaney [2008], however, they are able to test hypotheses on the effect of immigrants
on the intensive and extensive margins of trade. They find that the immigration effect is
concentrated on the extensive margin of trade: according to their results, immigrants con-
tribute to lowering the fixed costs of opening new business ventures in their home countries
to a much greater extent than they increase the average value per transaction. Peri and
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Requena-Silvente [2010] also apply instrumental variables regression to exclude endogene-
ity from trade to immigration and, as Briant et al. [2009], find a minor bias derived from
endogeneity. Within their robustness checks, they find that the immigration effect is con-
centrated in the provinces with a high share of immigrants over the total population and
is stronger in more recent years. While they briefly refer to the application of Poisson
estimation to address the potential heteroskedasticity bias in log-linearised models, they
do not specify the underlying model. As mentioned above, they assume equal wage levels
across provinces and do not include province-time dummies.
Bratti et al. [2012] present a peculiar model which integrates the use of province-level
data on trade and immigration from Italy with the inclusion of region-time and country-
region effects instead of province-time and country-province effects. This approach has
the advantages of allowing the inclusion of province-level determinants such as income and
distance while reducing the saturation of the model and thus leaving more scope for the
variation in immigration and trade to be explained by the model. However, the arguments
for adopting this approach are not fully grounded from the theoretical point of view -
again, while income levels and thus expenditures and production are allowed to vary in
their model, the average market access and level of competition, i.e. the multilateral
resistance terms are implicitly assumed to be the same within the same region without an
explicit comparison with the results of the model that uses the theory consistent set of
dummies. Contributions of the paper also include the use of an IV approach similarly to
Briant et al. [2009] and Peri and Requena-Silvente [2010] and the analysis, which draws
on Herander and Saavedra [2005], of the effects of distance on the networks effectiveness
in promoting trade.
2.5 Hypotheses
This paper aims to integrate the insights coming from the country-level study by Murat
and Pistoiesi [2009] and Flisi and Murat [2011] in terms of the trade-facilitating effect of
emigrant networks with those of the literature on sub-national units. It takes the case of
Spain because of its peculiar relevance to the problem: it is a country with a long-lasting
emigration hystory coupled with recent and booming immigration8. It aims at testing a
number of hypotheses on the effect of immigration and emigration stocks on the exports
of sub-national units with a theoretically and econometrically consistent methodology.
This implies appropriately taking into account the multilateral resistance term as well
as addressing methodological problems which stand at the ”frontiers of gravity research”
[Head and Mayer, 2014] and are outlined in Section 4.
The first basic hypothesis is that both emigrants and immigrants have a significant effect
8Another reason to lead this analysis on the Spanish case is the public availability of data on the main
variables of interest, especially the trade of provinces and the immigrant and emigrant stocks.
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on the trade of Spanish provinces (Hp 1.1). This hypothesis will be tested along with two
”corollaries” derived from the literature, that immigrants’ and emigrants’ effect on trade
is stronger with more culturally distant (Hp 1.2) and more institutionally distant countries
(Hp 1.3).
The second set of hypotheses relates to subnational heterogeneity. First, because there is
no reason to think that at least some of the trade costs and economic masses vary at the
province level as well as the country level, I hypothesize that province-level heterogeneity
in the multilateral resistance term has an impact on trade (Hp. 2.1). Second, I will use a
different estimation method to test Herander and Saavedra [2005]’s hypothesis that local
networks of immigrants (and emigrants) from the same province have a stronger effect on
the trade of provinces than more distant networks (Hp 2.2). Third, I will test, using a
method which is very similar to that used by Bandyopadhyay et al. [2008] to test ethnic
heterogeneity in the migration effect, whether there is heterogeneity among regions in the
immigrants’ and emigrants’ effects (Hp 2.3).
The third set of hypotheses looks at non-constancy in the elasticity of trade to immigration
and emigration. First, I hypothesize that the effect of immigration and emigration is
differentiated by the shares of immigrants in each province (Hp 3.1). This has been found
to be the case for immigration by Peri and Requena-Silvente [2010] on the 1995-2007
period. Second, I test the hypothesis that the immigration and emigration effect is non-
constant (Hp 3.2). This is to test the non-linearity hypothesis proposed by Gould [1994]
and Wagner et al. [2002]: before they can exert an effect on trade, a certain ”mass” has to
be reached by immigrants; after a given level, the returns from immigration to trade are
diminishing.
3 Data
The database used for the empirical analysis is a balanced panel based on export data
about 50 Spanish provinces9 (NUTS 3) and 65 countries over 5 years (2006-2010). The
selection of the countries is driven by the availability of province-level data on immigrant
and emigrant stocks, and by whether their share on total Spanish exports is at least 0,1%
every year. Overall, the selected countries account for more than 91% of total Spanish
international trade for each year of the panel (see table A.15 in the Appendix for the
complete list of countries).
The interpretation of the migration variables is subject to some caveats. Following the
literature on the migration-trade link, throughout this paper I refer to “immigration” in
a province as the stock of residents in that province who hold a non-Spanish citizenship
9The provinces of Ceuta and Melilla are excluded for data availability reasons.
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(data on immigration in Spain are from the National Statistics Institute, INE; see Table
A.16 in the Appendix for a list of the main data sources). As it is common in migra-
tion studies, this is an imperfect measure of immigration10 since it neglects the portion of
foreign-born people that have acquired the nationality of the host country. It also only
refers to formally residing people, neglecting undocumented immigrants, and it furthermore
neglects the intra-national mobility that is not registered in changes of residence. Simi-
larly, the emigration variable used here is imperfect as it refers to the stock of people that
have moved their residence outside Spain but are still recorded in the election registries
in Spain (as in Flisi and Murat [2011], data originate from the CERA, Censo Electoral de
Residentes Ausentes). These data are not informative as to the country of birth of these
emigrants, and thus in principle one cannot distinguish return migrants from the native
Spanish diaspora: only the portion of former residents in Spain who have expatriated and
who still vote in Spain is represented. Yet, maintaining one’s voting rights in Spain implies
the persistence of strong ties to Spain. It is thus relatively safe to assume these data to
more closely reflect the dynamics of the Spanish emigrant population than the dynam-
ics of return migration. Due to often circular migration ties between Spain and several
Latin-American countries, however, the results on the emigration variable should be inter-
preted with particular care 11. Furthermore, neither immigration nor emigration data at
the province level allow distinguishing between economically active and inactive migrants;
consequently, it cannot be elicited from these data whether migrants’ contribution to trade
is “active”, e.g. as entrepreneurs, intermediaries or labour force who sell primarily to their
home country, or whether it is an “indirect” one that goes through familiarization and
trust-building in the destination context with the home countries. This is a consequence of
the sub-national level of analysis: at the NUTS 3 level, the availability of detailed data on
immigrants’ characteristics, especially on skills, employment status and length of stay is
severely constrained: the results of the Labour Force Survey are only considered as reliable
at the NUTS 2 level.
Fig. 3 shows the growth rates of trade volumes, immigrant stocks and emigrant stocks
over the most recent period. For data availability reasons of the emigrant variable, this
period includes the period of the burst of the global financial crisis. On the whole, the
three variables have been growing over the period, with exports growing at an average
10“Immigration denotes the action by which a person establishes his or her usual residence in the territory
of a Member State for a period that is, or is expected to be, of at least 12 months, having previously
been usually resident in another Member State or a third country”; “Emigration denotes the action by
which a person, having previously been usually resident in the territory of a Member State, ceases to have
his or her usual residence in that Member State for a period that is, or is expected to be, of at least
12 months” (Eurostat definitions: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_SDDS/en/migr_flow_
esms.htm/unit_measure).
11The available INE data on residential variations to foreign countries report that from 2004 to 2011
the percentage of Spanish residents of Spanish nationality changing their residence to foreign countries has
been less than 25% of total residential variations in all years but 2005 (when it was 28,4%).
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rate of 6.46%, emigration stocks growing at an average rate of 4.17%, and immigration
stocks booming at an average rate of 17,9%. However, the 2008-2009 crisis period has
severely affected both exports and immigrant stocks. While the exports have rapidly
recovered, this period has brought the yearly growth of immigration stocks to stagnation.
On the contrary, emigrant stocks, which seem to roughly follow an opposite pattern than
immigrant stocks, have been growing faster since the crisis years on. The extremely high
levels of unemployment associated with the crisis in Spain are probably responsible for
these changes.
Figure 3: Growth rates in trade volumes, immigrant and emigrant stocks in Spain (country-level
data, 1997-2011). Source: own elaboration on Datacomex and INE data.
The correlation between the immigration and emigration variables is 0.10, so the two
variables can be assumed to portray quite different phenomena. Indeed the distribution of
immigrants and emigrants across provinces follows quite distinct, in some cases opposing,
patterns: where the immigrant share over total population in a given province is high, the
corresponding share of emigrants is often low (see Table A.17 in the Appendix, reporting
data about immigrants and emigrants distribution across provinces in 2010). As well as
the concentration of foreign population seen in section 2.3, also the share of residents with
a foreign nationality shows substantial variation across provinces. In 18 out of 52 provinces
the share of foreigners was above the national average in 2010, reaching above 20% in four
provinces (Alicante, Islas Baleares, Almer´ıa, Girona); in 15 provinces the share was below
5%; it lagged below 4% in Ca´diz, Ca´ceres, Badajoz, A Corun˜a, Co´rdoba and Jae´n.
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As to the origin and destination countries, Fig. 4 shows the subset of the most frequent
origin countries for immigrants and destination countries for emigrants. While in both
cases many are OECD and Spanish-speaking countries, the ranking is quite different. Ro-
mania and Morocco are the most frequent origin countries for immigrants (respectively
accounting for 14.5% and 13.1% of the immigrant population), while Argentina is by far
the most popular destination country for emigration, hosting 22% of the Spanish expatri-
ates (See also Table A.18 in the appendix for some information about the profile of the
migrants).
Figure 4: Top 15 origin countries of immigrants and destination countries of emigrants in Spain,
2010. Source: Own elaboration on INE data.
Table 1 reports the summary statistics for main variables of interest of this paper: the value
of the exports from province i to country n in year t (Xnit), the stock of immigrants from
country n living in province i at year t (Imminit) and the stock of emigrants from province
i living in country n at year t (Eminit). Included are also province i gross product in
year t (Yit), country n GDP in year t (Ynt), province i population in year t (Nit), country
n population in year t (Nnt). The extent of the correlation is higher between exports
and each of the migration variables (the correlation of exports is respectively 0.15 with
immigration stocks and 0.24 with emigration stocks12 ), than between immigration and
emigration stocks. The correlation of the migration variables with the province income is
relatively high - the correlation between province income and immigration is 0.33; between
province income and emigration it is 0.17. It is, instead very low with the country income
variable: between emigration and country income the correlation is 0.08; it goes to almost
zero (0.001) between immigration and country income. This suggests that probably the
correlation is to be found at the local rather than at the country-level and is another
element in favour of the use of subnational units.
As the summary statistics in Table 1 show, the variation in the data is high. The export,
12The correlations between the log of the exports and the log of the two variables are respectively 0.39
and 0.45.
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Table 1: Summary statistics
Variable Description Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Xnit value of the exports from
province i to country n in
year t
15195 53667.32 243745 .00 7208594
Imminit stock of immigrants
from country n living in
province i at year t
15195 1474.95 7021.12 1 210823
Eminit stock of emigrants from
province i living in coun-
try n at year t
15195 389.32 1880.05 1 46545
Yit province i gross product in
year t
15195 2.18 e+07 3.23 e+07 1927919 1.93 e+08
Xnt country n GDP in year t 15195 8.41 e+08 1.99 e+09 2823504 1.45 e+10
Nit province i population in
year t
15195 939.34 1134.77 91.90 6358.60
Njt country n population in
year t
15195 80714.15 221064.50 79.87 1341414
income and migration data are typically highly concentrated around the small values of
the distributions, with long right tails. This is typical in trade data, combining data about
pairs that may be radically different in terms of economic sizes (and, consequently, in
terms of their push/pull factors for immigration and emigration). This variance is usually
reflected in heteroskedasticity, which in turn can seriously bias the estimates when they are
based on logs, as noted by Santos-Silva and Tenreyro [2006] (see section 4). The migration
variables, especially the emigration variable, are quite zero inflated: the share of zeros out
of the total number of observations is 4,09% for Imminit and 13,45% for Eminit. Instead,
because of the data selection procedure described above, the data on exports only have
a negligible number of zeros: the unit of exports is thousands of euros, and the share of
province exports to partner countries below 1 mile of euros is limited to 0,24% of total
observations.
Figure 5 brings together the data on trade and migration for the province of Madrid in
2010.
Running a similar exercise as in Fig. 1, in Fig. 5 I plotted, for Madrid’s OECD trade
partners, the export/GDP ratio to each with the distance-weighted immigrant and emigrant
stocks from each country. The rationale for taking distance-weighted immigration and
emigration stocks is that migration typically decreases with distance. The rationale for
taking OECD countries only is to achieve a certain degree of institutional similarity which
can be expected to reduce the omitted variables bias in the relation. The relationship
appears positive and the immigrants simple regression line is steeper than the emigrants’.
21
Figure 5: The migration-trade link: province of Madrid and OECD countries, 2010. The graph
shows the relationship between GDP-weighted exports and the distance-weighted immigrants and
emigrant stocks. Own elaboration on Datacomex, INE, CERA and FMI data.
The picture is similar when restricting the analysis to EU countries only. This purely
descriptive result motivates a more rigorous econometric analysis of the relationship.
4 Econometric Strategy
4.1 Main econometric issues in gravity models
Briant et al. [2009] identify three econometric issues to be addressed for consistently esti-
mating gravity models: zeros, heteroskedasticty and endogeneity. This partially contributes
to explain the variety of estimation methods outlined in the review above.
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4.1.1 Zero trade flows
The issue of zero trade flows is a concern for the international trade literature in general
[Helpman et al., 2008] and is particularly relevant for the trade of sub-national units, where
small flows are common and zero flows are frequently observed. The problem of zero flows
arises from the log linearization in gravity models, due to the indeterminacy of the log of
zero. Simple OLS estimates are thus only possible on non-zero observations. The censoring
at zero introduces a bias in the simple OLS estimator and the model is more consistently
estimated in levels through Tobit models or models of the Poisson family, as argued by
Santos-Silva and Tenreyro [2006] and Eaton and Kortum [2002]. Eaton and Tamura [1994]
threshold Tobit model is one of the first applications of the Tobit estimator to gravity
models which has been applied to the migration-trade link literature by Herander and
Saavedra [2005] and by Dunlevy [2006]; Wagner et al. [2002] use the Heckman procedure.
As to my data, the sample selection dictated by the need to ensure that data are available
on the migration variables causes the issue of zero trade to be negligible, limited to only
0.24% of the observations. Hence, the issue of zero trade will not be addressed here.
4.1.2 Heteroskedasticity and functional form of the errors
Santos-Silva and Tenreyro [2006], drawing on Manning and Mullahy [2001], note that the
usual procedure of log-linearizing the gravity equation and estimating it by OLS could
introduce a bias in the estimates when the error term is heteroskedastic. Because the
expected value of the logarithm of a random variable depends both on its mean and on
the higher-order moments of its distribution, in presence of heteroskedasticity it cannot
be assured that the unconditional mean of the log of the errors is zero, and that their
conditional mean is independent from the covariates. In practice, the variation in trade
data typically increases by higher trade flows; higher trade flows are in general associated
with greater economic size and lower bilateral trade costs, i.e. the gravity model covariates.
While this poses no problem in standard OLS estimation, by log-linearisation the variance
enters the determination of the expected value of the error term. Thus, a violation of
the homoskedasticity assumption will in general lead to the fact that expected value of
the log-linearized error depends on the covariates, leading to inconsistent OLS estimates.
The bias in the OLS estimation is partially reduced by fixed effects. Santos-Silva and
Tenreyro [2006] compare OLS, Gamma regression, non-linear least squares (NLS) and
Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood estimators in a cross-sectional context. They argue in
favour of the use of a Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood estimator as it is more consistent
than OLS and more efficient than NLS. Because the Poisson estimator allows accounting
for the zeros in the dependent variable and is consistent even by variance misspecification
[Wooldridge, 2002], the authors prefer the Poisson Pseudo-Maximum-Likelihood Estimator
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(PPML) to other count models such as the Negative Binomial13.
The Santos-Silva and Tenreyro argument to make the PPML the new ”workhorse” for
gravity models in the presence of heteroskedasticity has been recently challenged by Head
and Mayer [2014] in their handbook chapter. The selection of the appropriate estimation
method based on considerations on the functional form of the errors lies in what the authors
call the ”frontiers of gravity research”. The authors compare the moment conditions of
the PPML and of the OLS with those of the Gamma PML and note that the OLS and
Gamma PML pursue a similar objective: in the case of the Gamma, to set to zero the
sum of the percent deviations of actual trade from predicted trade; in the case of OLS,
to set to zero the sum of the log deviations of actual from predicted trade. The two are
approximately equal (p.40). The Poisson PML moment conditions, instead, set to zero the
level deviations of the actual from predicted trade. For this reason, Poisson PML gives
more weight to larger observations compared to the other two estimators. The Gamma
regression, like the Poisson PMLE, delivers consistent estimates regardless of the functional
form of the errors as long as the conditional mean is correctly specified, because it also
measures the dependent variable in levels. The relative efficiency of the two estimators
depends on the assumptions made about the variance of the errors. Drawing on Santos-
Silva and Tenreyro [2006] and on Manning and Mullahy [2001], Head and Mayer [2014]
propose a general relation linking the variance to the conditional mean which contains the
different cases:
var[Xni|zni] = hE[Xni|zni]λ (8)
The Poisson PML is the most efficient estimator by λ = 1, corrisponding to a constant
variance-to-mean ratio, a generalization of the Poisson assumption of h = λ = 1. The
homoskedastic OLS estimator in logs is the MLE by λ = 2, which corresponds to a constant
coefficient of variation. By heteroskedasticity and λ = 2, the consistent and efficient
estimator is the Gamma PML14.Both the Poisson and the Gamma PML remain consistent
13Santos-Silva and Tenreyro also argue against the use of the Negative Binomial in their “Log of gravity”
webpage,http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~jmcss/LGW.html:
”The estimator proposed in the Log of Gravity is simply a weighted non-linear least squares
estimator. It turns out that with the proposed weights, the first-order conditions for this esti-
mator are identical to those of the Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood regression. Therefore,
the fact that we recommend the used of a count data estimator for the gravity equation is
just a fortunate coincidence that allows the use of a well-known regression method which is
widely available is econometric and statistics software. (. . . ) both the negative-binomial and
the zero-inflated regression models have the important drawback of not being invariant to the
scale of the dependent variable. That is, measuring trade in dollars or in thousands of dollars
will lead to different estimates of the elasticities of interest!”
Head and Mayer [2014], too, urge researchers to ”resist the siren song of Negative Binomial”, mainly because
of the problem that the estimates depend on the unit of measurement in the dependent variable (Boulhol
and Bosquet [2012]).
14Another possible option is the heteroskedastic-retransformed OLS estimator (Manning and Mullahy
[2001], which is however not practicable in my case.
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by h > 1, i.e. by overdispersion [Wooldridge, 2002]. Equation (8) can be log-transformed
and applied to the sample counterparts of the mean and variance parameters to become
the Manning and Mullahy [2001] test on the underlying functional form of the errors, or
Santos-Silva and Tenreyro [2006]’s ”Park-type test”; Head and Mayer [2014] dub it ”MaMu
test”:
lnˆ2ni = constant + λl̂nXni (9)
Based on the results of a series of Monte Carlo simulations, Head and Mayer [2014] confirm
the robustness of the Poisson and Gamma PML to different functional form of the errors.
However, they also find some evidence against the Poisson as the new ”workhorse” for
gravity equations: by mis-specification of the conditional mean, the Poisson PML results
severely biased due to the higher weight given to larger observations, while the OLS on
logs and the Gamma PML are consistent by sufficiently large sample sizes. The kind of
model mis-specification that they introduce is of particular interest for empirical works on
the migration-trade link: they assume non-constancy in the variable of interest. As seen
above, while the large majority of the recent works assume constant elasticity of trade
to migration, earlier works explored the hypothesis of diminishing returns to migration
[Gould, 1994, Rauch and Trinidade, 2002, Wagner et al., 2002].
Hence, none of these estimation methods can be considered as a single ”workhorse”. In-
stead, the consistent and efficient estimator in relation to the specific issues posed by a
given dataset is more likely to be identified from the comparison of the three estimation
methods. Head and Mayer [2014] identify a few simple selection criteria (p.44):
1. If the three give similar results, the model appears well specified, with approximately
log-normal errors and constant variance. In this case, the OLS is the MLE.
2. If the Poisson and Gamma PML estimates are similar to each other and different
from the OLS, heteroskedasticity should be considered as a problem and the OLS is
to be considered as inconsistent.
3. If the Gamma PML and OLS coefficients are similar and the Poisson estimates are
smaller in absolute values, there are two possible interpretations: (a) By small sam-
ples, this may be due to small sample bias in either of the PML estimators. If the λˆ
derived from the MaMu test in Equation (??) is significantly below 2, Poisson should
be preferred. (b) By large samples, significantly divergent estimates may a signal
non-constant elasticities and model mis-specification.
In what follows, I will apply this approach. I will run the three estimators (OLS, Poisson
and Gamma) on my data, and compare their results, as outlined more in details in section
4.2.
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4.1.3 Reverse Causality
According to Briant et al. [2009], the third econometric issue affecting trade studies is
endogeneity, which may arise from reverse causality or omitted variables.
As to reverse causality, Briant et al. [2009] Peri and Requena-Silvente [2010] and Bratti
et al. [2012], using sub-national trade and migration data on France, Spain and Italy,
apply instrumental variables approaches; their IV estimates, mainly based on imputed
values of immigration drawn by the distribution of immigrants in the nineties, confirm
the estimates obtained by OLS. On the other hand, as argumented by Gould [1994] and
Briant et al. [2009]it is unlikely that the preferential bilateral links between two countries
are simultaneously causing trade and migration flows: migration flows, are mainly driven
by family reunification motives, wage and income differentials and similarity in languages
(see also [de Haas, 2010]). Therefore, I will assume that reverse causality is not a problem
in my data and I will not address it specifically in my estimates.
4.1.4 Omitted variables and heterogeneity
Another possible ground for the violation of the assumption of independence of the errors
may derive from omitted variables.
In the case of the gravity models, a large component of the multilateral resistance terms,
as well as of the bilateral trade determinants, are known to be unobservables (Anderson
and van Wincoop, 2003, Baldwin and Taglioni, 2007; see also section 2.1). By panel data,
the time-varying component of the multilateral resistance terms should be accounted for
by time-varying effects; the correlation between unobservable bilateral trade determinants
and included bilateral trade determinants (migration variables, in this case) should be
accounted for by dyadic time-invariant effects [Baldwin and Taglioni, 2007].
Additional unobservables may be the consequence of heterogeneity at the level of the
trading pair that affect trade through the bilateral trade costs channel. This is discussed,
for the case of panel data, in Cheng and Wall [2005] and Bandyopadhyay et al. [2008]. These
studies argue in favour of the inclusion of bilateral pair-specific fixed effects, discarding
other, less computationally burdensome, simplifications deriving from arbitrary restrictions
imposed to the effects (e.g. symmetric pair-specific effects, a single fixed effect for a given
importer towards all exporters, a single exporter effect towards all importers).
Including the three sets of effects (importer-time, exporter-time and dyadic) implies that
bilateral-specific time-invariant variables are absorbed in the trading pair effects, and
that importer-specific and exporter-specific time-varying variables are absorbed in the
importer-time and exporter-time effects. This leaves out for estimation only those variables
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that are at the same time dyadic and time-varying, such as immigration and emigration
stocks.
The absorption of variables of interest in the fixed effects does not prevent a analyzing their
role in determining trade flows. According to Cheng and Wall [2005], the unbiased estima-
tion of time-invariant variables such as distance, language and institutional similarities is
best performed by running a regression with the estimated pair effects as dependent vari-
able and the time-invariant variables as regressors. This technique leads them to confirm
the effect of time-invariant variables in the expected directions, in line with the findings of
the gravity literature.
4.2 Econometric Model and Steps
Based on the considerations above, the optimal strategy would be to include the three sets
of effects in the OLS, Poisson and Gamma estimations as suggested in section 4.1.4 and to
proceed with the steps outlined in section 4.1.2 to identify the suitable model for the specific
data at stake. While this poses no problem to the OLS and Poisson estimation, Gamma
estimation with many dummies in short panels is problematic. Here, the estimation of
the coefficients of the bilateral fixed effects relies on the time variation only; when the
panel is short, the coefficient cannot be consistently estimated; and the inconsistency could
in principle pass on to the estimates of the variables of interest [Cameron and Trivedi,
2009].
To the best of my knwoledge, there is no way to estimate a Gamma regression with a
high number of dummies without incurring in the incidental parameters problem. On the
other hand, not including the bilateral fixed effects implies incurring certainly on omitted
variable bias: the bilateral fixed effects are jointly highly significant; they are supported
by likelihood ratio tests, dramatically increase the R-squared and decrease the Akaike
Information Criterion statistics. Thus, I will include the three sets of effects in the Gamma
regression and rely on the high number of time-varying exporter and importer effects, as
well as on the very high number of observations (15195) on which the migration variables
can be estimated, to prevent the possible inconsistency from passing on to the variables of
interest.
The basic theory-consistent model to analyse the immigrants’ and emigrants’ effects on the
trade of Spanish provinces is the following:
Xnit = αX
b1
ntY
b2
it Immi
β1
nitEmi
β2
nite
(γ1θnt+γ2ωit+γ3ηni+εnit) (10)
Where:
Xnit = Nominal value of the exports from the Spanish province i to country n at time t;
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Xnt = Total expenditures by country n, approximated by GDP,
Yit = Total production by province i, approximated by province gross product;
Imminit = Stock of immigrants from country n living in province i at time t;
Eminit = Stock of emigrants from province i living in country n at time t;
θnt = vector of the importer-time effects, corresponding to country-time dummies;
ωit= vector of the exporter-time effects, corresponding to province-time dummies;
ηni= vector of the trading-pair specific fixed effects, corresponding to province-country
dummies
The right-hand side of the equation is log-linearised in the estimation. The left-hand side
of the equation is in levels for in the cases of the Poisson and Gamma PML estimation and
in logs in the case of OLS estimation.
In practice, estimating Xnt together with importer-time effects, and Yit together with
exporter-time effects in the same equation gives rise to perfect multicollinearity15.
As mentioned in section 3,to address potential non-linearities and the indeterminacy of the
log of zero in the immigration and emigration variables, I add one unit to each observation
and include a No-Immigrant-Dummy (NID) and a No-Emigrant-Dummy (NED) to the
equation.
The log-linearised model to be estimated by OLS becomes:
ln(Xnit) = β1ln(Imminit) + β2ln(Eminit) + γ1θnt + γ2ωit + γ3ηni + εnit (11)
The model to be estimated by Poisson and Gamma PML is the following:
Xnit = β1ln(Imminit) + β2ln(Eminit) + γ1θnt + γ2ωit + γ3ηni + εnit (12)
As discussed above, I follow Head and Mayer [2014] in estimating the model with the three
estimation methods, construing the whole strategy as a ”robustness-exploring ensemble”16.
15The analyst may actually be able to estimate log-linear versions of model 10 and to view coefficients
for the income variables, as in Peri and Requena-Silvente [2010] and in Bandyopadhyay et al. [2008]. This
comes however at the cost of omitting some dummies, which are dropped automatically by the software and
are not fully controlled by the analyst. This implies that the estimated coefficients for the income variables
actually refer to the single cases for which the dummies have been dropped and cannot be interpreted more
generally.
16The Poisson estimates are run using the robust feature of the xtpoisson estimator in Stata12, which
includes the features of xtpqml, the previous version of the command developed by Timothy Simcoe. The
Gamma estimates are run using the glm command with the options link(log) family(gamma) with a series
of trading pair dummies representing the three sets of effects and standard errors clustered at the pair level.
In the case of OLS, too, unless otherwise specified, the standard errors are clustered at the pair level.
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To draw conclusions about the consistent model, in section I will test for heteroskedasticity
and learn about the functional form of the residuals through a MaMu test; I will compare
the estimates based on the criteria proposed by Head and Mayer [2014] and draw conclu-
sions on this basis. The selected model will be used to test more specific hypotheses (see
section 4.3.
4.3 Operationalization of the hypotheses
The immigrants and emigrants’ effect. Hypothesis 1.1 on the aggregate effect of
immigrants and emigrants on trade will be tested in terms of the statistical significance of
β1 and β2 in equations 11 and 12.
The ”corollaries” about the expected stronger role of immigrants and emigrants promoting
trade towards countries that are more distant institutionally (Hp 1.2) and culturally (Hp
1.3) will be tested by interacting ln(Imminit) and ln(Eminit) with, respectively, a DEU and
a DSpa dummy. DEU equals 1 for EU Member States and zero otherwise; the coefficients
of its interaction with the migration variables are aimed to test the role of institutional
(dis)similarity in promoting trade. DSpa equals 1 when the country has Spanish as an
official language and zero otherwise. Il closely mirrors remote colonial ties; the coefficient
of its interaction terms with ln(Imminit) and ln(Eminit) are expected to test the role of
cultural similarity in promoting the migration-trade link. A confirmation of the hypotheses
that the migration effect is stronger towards more culturally and institutionally distant
countries is usually read as a proof of the prevalence of the information and enforcement
effects, mediated by immigrants and emigrants, on the preference effect mechanism of
trade promotion, as both information and enforcement costs are likely to increase with
institutional and cultural distance.
Sub-national heterogeneity. As this paper focuses on the exports side, the test for
the heterogeneity on the multilateral resistance term (Hypothesis 2.1) will focus on the
term Ωi in the structural gravity model (equation 4), i.e. on the average market access of
the province on all markets, which by panel data is time-varying and corresponds to ωit in
model 10. The papers which omit this term explicitly or implicitly assume that the average
market access is the same across provinces. Hence, to verify the hypothesis of province-
level heterogeneity in this term, I will run a statistical test on the basic specification to
verify the joint statistical significance of the set of province-time effects; I will also estimate
the mode for each estimator l with a different specification that excludes the province-time
effects but includes province income (to ensure that the exclusion of the province-specific
multilateral resistance term does not exclude the production term Yi). I will compare
the log-likelihood and AIC statistic17 to conclude whether province-level heterogeneity is
supported by the data, besides theory.
17Stata does not allow likelihood ratio tests on models with clustered and robust standard errors.
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The test of hypothesis 2.2, that trade-relevant information more effectively flows through
local networks of immigrants than over national-level networks, will be tested by applying
the procedure in Herander and Saavedra [2005] to my data and estimation methods. Two
additional variables called ln(ImmiOutnit) and ln(EmiOutnit) will be included in models
11 and 12. The term ln(ImmiOutnit) represents the total stock of immigrants from country
n living in provinces other than i at time t, and ln(EmiOutnit) represents the total stock
of emigrants registered in provinces other than i who had migrated to country n at time t.
They are meant to represent national networks of immigrants and emigrants that extend
beyond the province. A positive and significant effect of ln(ImmiOutnit) or ln(EmiOutnit)
would suggest that the information that is relevant to promoting trade towards country n
is exchanged country-wide, respectively within the group of immigrants from n and within
the group of emigrants to n. A positive and significant effect of ln(Imminit) and ln(Eminit)
only is instead to be interpreted as a sign that the information that is relevant for trade is
predominantly exchanged within the local network of immigrants from country n living in
province i; in the emigration case, a positive effect of the latter could be interpreted as a
sign of localised information flows on business opportunities abroad occurring prior to the
decision to leave.
Finally, Hypothesis 2.3 on the region-specific migration effects will be tested by letting β1
and β2 vary by province, in the same way that Bandyopadhyay et al. [2008] allowed it to
vary by country. I expect to find evidence that the effect of immigrants and emigrants on
trade is differentiated by regions. I will substitute the coefficients β1 and β2 of ln(Imminit)
and ln(Eminit) in equations 11 and 12 with region-specific β1i and β2i.
Immigration and emigration non-constancy. Hypothesis 3.1 that the effect of immi-
gration and emigration is differentiated by the shares of immigrants in each province will
be tested by splitting the sample into provinces with a high, intermediate and low share of
immigrants, and into provinces with a high, intermediate and low share of emigrants.
The share of immigrants in province i simmii is calculated on the overall population of
immigrants from any country over the total population of province i. Similarly, the share
of emigrants from province i over the total population semii is calculated on all the Spanish
expatriates from province i to any country. The values of simmii and s
emi
i for the single
province will be considered as high if they lie above the 33rd percentile, intermediate if
they are between the 34th and the 67th percentile and high if they are above the 67th
percentile of the values of the shares of immigrants in all provinces each year.
Hypothesis 3.2 of non-constant elasticity of trade to immigration cannot be directly tested
by an adaptation of the methodology applied by Gould [1994] and Wagner et al. [2002] as
it would imply the inclusion of fixed effects in non-linear least squares estimators18. This
hypothesis will thus be addressed through the inclusion of non-linear terms in the model as
18Stata does not allow including fixed effects in nlls models
30
part of the exploration of the correct specification of the functional form of the conditional
mean.
5 Results
5.1 Immigrants’ and emigrants’ effects on trade
In table 2 I compare the three estimation methods to address hypothesis 1.1: whether
immigrants and emigrants have an effect on the trade of Spanish provinces. This table
shows a pattern that is common to most of the estimation results in this paper. The OLS
and Gamma estimates show a positive and significant effect of the immigrant stocks on
trade, with magnitudes that are comparable with each other: the OLS estimates show that,
by a 10% increase in the immigrant population, trade is expected to grow on average by
1.6%; according to the Gamma estimates, by the same increase in the immigrant stocks,
trade will grow by 1.4%. The Poisson estimation, instead, does not portray any recognizable
pattern of trade creation by either immigrants or emigrants. Instead, they show a positive
and significant effect of the no-immigrant dummy, pointing at possible non-linearities in
the immigration variable. The magnitude of NID is almost exactly the same in the Poisson
PML and the Gamma PML regression.
Table 2: Regression results Hp 1.1 - The effect of immigrants and emigrants on the trade of Spanish
provinces
Model OLS PPML GammaPML
ln(Imminit) 0·162∗∗∗ 0·045 0·137∗∗∗
(0·061) (0·048) (0·032)
ln(Eminit) −0·012 0·030 0·005
(0·044) (0·031) (0·026)
NID 0·176 0·217 ∗ ∗ 0·216∗∗∗
(0·111) (0·108) (0·065)
NED 0·030 0·083 0·045
(0·067) (0·063) (0·040)
Trading pair effects Yes Yes Yes
Province-time effects Yes Yes Yes
Country-time effects Yes Yes Yes
N 15195 15195 15195
r2 0·119
log-likelihood −14537·1 −1·54e+07 −143798·1
AIC 29994·2 3·08e+07 288516·1
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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The numerosity of the observations allows excluding small sample bias. The scenario in
which the two PML estimates, both supposed consistent, show different results, falls under
case 3 of the options presented in section 4.1.2, i.e. one where heteroskedasticity in the
OLS estimates is not too marked and the elasticitity of the variable of interest has been
misspecified. The case presented in Head and Mayer [2014] is the case of a non-constant
elasticity, which the Poisson PML mis-estimates because of the higher weight it gives to
more sizeable observations in the trade variable.
It is important to note that the model presented here is derived from a vast literature
which, with the exceptions of the earlier works by Gould [1994] and Wagner et al. [2002],
routinely assumes a linear relationship between the log of the immigration stocks and the
log of trade. Thus, confirming model mis-specification would bear important implications
to this literature. This possibility will be analysed in section 5.2.
Reliance on the Gamma PML estimates, however, is in turn subject to some caveats. The
incidental parameter problem affects the estimation of the fixed effects in the Gamma
regression, making their estimates inconsistent. While the coefficients of the fixed effects
are per se of little interest to the analyst, it is possible that this inconsistency affects the
estimation of the variables of interest [Cameron and Trivedi, 2009]. Appying the ”tetrad”
approach proposed in Head et al. [2010] to Gamma (and Poisson) estimation as in table
3 partially addresses this problem, for it allows algebraic elimination of the importer-time
and exporter-time effects (but not of the trading pair effects)19.
The results of the regressions on the tetrads in table 3 are quite similar to those of the
regressions based on the structural gravity equation. Again, the Gamma and the OLS
regression support a positive and significant role of the immigrants in promoting the inter-
national trade of Spanish provinces while, as before, the PPML estimates do not support
a significant role of either immigrants or emigrants. The magnitude of the elasticities, in
this case, ranges between 0.14 and 0.187, a slightly wider range than in the previous case.
As to the Gamma regression, the estimates based on the tetrads method are even closer to
the Gamma regression in table 2 than are the OLS regressions: eliminating 575 indicator
variables has not radically altered the estimates, suggesting the inconsistent estimates of
the time-varying effects were not affecting ln(Imminit) and ln(Eminit); but it must be
noted that the estimation of the time-varying effects counts on a much higher number of
observations than the estimation of dyadic effects. Yet, it is not possible to definitely rule
out the possibility that this occurs through the remaing time-invariant pair-specific effects.
19Efficient estimation using the tetrad method requires multi-way clustering at the level of the pair, of
the importer-year and of the exporter-year, which I performed in the case of OLS using the code provided
by Head et al. [2010] in their web appendix. Multi-way clustering is not available for Gamma and Poisson
regression so I used clustering at the pair level for Gamma and robust standard errors for the Poisson
estimation. I also compare the results of multi-way clustering and of clustering at the pair level in the case
of OLS, showing that the significance in estimates is not radically affected. In any case, the interest here is
more on the magnitude of the point estimates than on their the significance.
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Table 3: Regression results - Tetrads
Model Head et al. [2010] OLS PPML GammaPML
ln(Imminit) 0·187∗∗∗ 0·185∗∗∗ −0·122 0·140∗∗∗
(0·053) (0·052) (0·103) (0·031)
ln(Eminit) −0·0229 0·026 −0·127 0·038
(0·052) (0·040) (0·110) (0·027)
NID 0·244∗ 0·192∗ 0·179 0·194∗∗∗
(·114) (0·100) (0·175) (0·066)
NED 0·016 0·042 −0·102 0·051
(·069) (0·065) (0·138) (0·044)
Trading pair effects Yes◦ Yes Yes Yes
Province-time effects Yes◦ No No No
Country-time effects Yes◦ No No No
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant −1·02e−09 31·411∗∗∗ 13·843∗∗∗
(·018) (5·572) (4·077)
N 14625 15195 15195 15195
r2 0·008
Note: Reference importer is France, reference exporter is the province of Madrid. All dependent
and independent variables are ”tetraded” and demeaned with respect to the reference importer
and exporter (see [Head and Mayer, 2014, Head et al., 2010]). Multi-way clustered standard errors
in parentheses in column ”Head et al. [2010]”; standard errors are clustered at the pair level in
columns ”OLS” and ”GammaPML”. Standard errors are robust in column ”PPML”.
◦All variables tetraded and de-meaned by pair, which is equivalent to including the three sets of
effects.
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
While it is not possible to definitely exclude the possibility that the Gamma estimates
are inconsistent, the similarity of the Gamma and OLS estimates seems to be a recurrent
pattern in the different specifications reported in section 5.3, where the migration variables
are articulated according to differing country groupings.
5.2 Tests on the underlying distribution of the errors
In this section I will address the underlying distribution of the errors through some tests
based on Manning and Mullahy [2001] and Santos-Silva and Tenreyro [2006] to identify
the most efficient model among the three. The coefficient of interest in the Park-type
test suggested by Manning and Mullahy [2001] and Santos-Silva and Tenreyro [2006] and
reported in table 4 is the λ in equation 9. Regressing the log of the squared residuals
on the log of the fitted values of the OLS regression, the estimate for λ is 1.56. Because
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the MaMu test is in fact a modification of Park’s test for heteroskedasticity, this result
confirms that the OLS estimates are affected by some heteroskedasticity. Because the
estimates of the MaMu test may be affected by heteroskedasticity as well as those of the
gravity regressions[Santos-Silva and Tenreyro, 2006], ? advise to rather rely on the PML
estimates for λ. The coefficients for λ estimated by Poisson and Gamma PML are in
both cases very close to 2. This result points at a constant coefficient of variation in the
residuals; in this case the most efficient estimators are the homoskedastic OLS on logs,
which is the maximum likelihood estimator in case it is available, and the Gamma PML
[Manning and Mullahy, 2001]. This explains why, if heteroskedasticity is not too marked,
the Gamma and OLS estimates are quite similar.
Table 4: Manning and Mullahy test on the underlying distribution of the errors
Model OLS residuals Poisson PML residuals Gamma PML residuals
ln(µˆ) 1·562∗∗∗ 1·981∗∗∗ 2·123∗∗∗
(·008) (0·130) (0·006)
Constant −0·486∗∗∗ 15·728∗∗∗ −1·405∗∗∗
(·0725) (0·066) (0·059)
N 15195 15195 15195
r2 0·702 0·014 0·922
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Table 5: Simple regression of the residuals on the covariates
Model OLS residuals Poisson PML residuals Gamma PML residuals
ln(Imminit) 0·485∗∗∗ 0·312 ∗ ∗ 0·354∗∗∗
(0·115) (0·126) (0·095)
ln(Eminit) −0·190 −0·033 −0·038
(0·119) (0·091) (0·076)
NID 0·636∗∗∗ 0·367 0·465 ∗ ∗
(0·222) (0·233) (0·186)
NED −0·0322 0·081 0·065
(0·160) (0·142) (0·119)
Constant 10·93 ∗ ∗∗ 14·476∗∗∗ 25·821∗∗∗
(0·728) (0·731) (0·636)
N 15195 15195 15195
r2 0·0970 0·114 0·936
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
In table 5 I perform a similar exercise regressing the log of the squared residuals on the
covariates. In the three models, the variance of the errors increases in the logs of the
immigrant stocks. To detect whether this result is to be interpreted as a sign of functional
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Table 6: RESET tests on the estimation methods
Model OLS model PPML model GammaPML
Square of the fitted values −·241 −0·1103 −1·33e−13
P-value 0·0004 0·1455 0·000
Cube of the fitted values ·0067 0·0107 1·42e−20
P-value 0·0137 0·4352 0·000
Joint p-value 0·0000 0·0092 ·
form mis-specification and non-constancy in the covariates, as suggested by case 3 in Head
and Mayer [2014], in table ?? I report the p-values resulting from Ramsey [1969] RESET-
tests on each estimation method, where, differently from [Santos-Silva and Tenreyro, 2006],
I also include the cube of the fitted values. The results of the tests provide some evidence
in favour of the hypothesis of functional form mis-specification and of non-linearity in the
migration variables for Poisson and OLS. In the cases of OLS the p-values of the RESET
tests are always below 5%. The tests for the Gamma PML, while very precise, result
in coefficients for the square and cube of the fitted values that are so small that they
actually confirm the consistency of the estimator. The results of the diagnostic test on
the distribution of the errors, thus, coherently lead to selecting the Gamma PML as the
consistent estimator. The Gamma estimator, with respect to the PPML, appears also more
flexible in terms of distributional assumptions.
Table 7: Regression results - Non-linearity in migration
Model OLS PPML GammaPML
ln(Imminit) 0·18∗ 0·11 0·10∗
(0·11) (0·08) (0·06)
ln(Imminit)
2 −0·00 −0·01 0·01
(0·02) (0·01) (0·01)
ln(Eminit) −0·03 −0·04 0·01
(0·08) (0·06) (0·05)
ln(Eminit)
2 0·00 0·01 −0·00
(0·01) (0·01) (0·01)
NID 0·19 0·27 ∗ ∗ 0·19 ∗ ∗
(0·13) (0·12) (0·07)
NED 0·02 0·03 0·05
(0·08) (0·07) (0·05)
N 15195·00 15195·00 15195·00
r2 0·12
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Based on the tests performed above, the question arises of whether the differences in the
estimation results between the OLS, Poisson and Gamma estimates are due other forms of
non-linearity or functional form mis-specification or simply to differences in the efficiency
of the estimators.
The main problem with the Poisson PML is related with the possibility of conditional mean
mis-specification implied by the Ramsey test in Table 6: indeed, while the distributional
assumptions of independence and small probability may look peculiar for trade data, and
the value of the constant in table 4 implies h = 2.75 in equation 9, i.e. overdispersion,
these should not matter for the consistency of the estimator as long as the conditional
mean is correctly specified(Wooldridge [2002]; see also Santos Silva and Tenreyro’s ”Log
of gravity webpage”). The results of the Ramsey test in table 6 shed some doubts on this
assumption.
As the residuals result roughly log-normally distributed, the homoskedastic OLS estimator
would be the MLE estimator; according to the simulations performed by Head and Mayer
[2014], it should also be more robust than the Poisson PML estimator to functional form
mis-specification. Whether the heteroskedasticity that has been detected in the estimator
has practical implications depends on the countervailing effects of the positive bias in
the OLS estimator introduced by heteroskedasticity vis-a`-vis the high number of effects
included in the specification which drive the estimates towards zero. In the specifications
carried out in this paper, the difference in the magnitude of the coefficients between the
OLS and the Gamma PML is between 10 and 35%, so, assuming consistency of the Gamma
estimator, this should be roughly the order of magnitude of the bias.
The reason for the persisting differences in the estimates of the OLS, Poisson and Gamma
PML could be found in the non-linearity: including the squared terms of ln(Imminit) and
ln(Eminit) (Table 7) in the model, however, has the effect of reducing the efficiency of
the linear estimates, while the squared terms result both economically and statistically
insignificant. The point estimates, while not statistically significant from zero, are more
aligned. The results are similar when including a cubic term.
An alternative explanation for the divergence between the PPML and Gamma estimates
could be found in the different weights attributed by the estimators to the trade flows of
different sizes [Head and Mayer, 2014]: the Poisson estimator attributes greater weight to
larger trade flows, those which are likely to rely less on immigrant and emigrant networks
because they are mainly determined by geographic proximity, institutional similarity and
common trade arrangements; by contrast, according to Santos-Silva and Tenreyro [2006]the
Gamma estimator gives more weight to smaller (and noisier) trade flows, those which are
more likely to rely on immigrant and emigrant networks. I could not find support to this
explanation in a series of unreported regressions where I scaled the variables taking into
account Eaton and Kortum [2002], where I split the immigrant and emigrant variables by
their above-median and below median elements and where I restricted the analysis to the
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smallest 75% of the observations: in all cases, the results remained qualitatively unchanged
20
Based on the considerations above, I will rely on the Gamma estimates to test hypotheses
in the next section 5.3. For the sake of completeness and in order to show the systematic
similarity of the OLS and Gamma estimates, however, in what follows I will report the
results of the estimates for the three estimation methods.
5.3 Testing of the Hypotheses
In sections 2.5 and 4.3 I outlined a series of Hypotheses that can now be tested based on
the identification of the OLS as the consistent and efficient model.
1.1 Immigrants’ and emigrants’ aggregate effects on trade
Hp 1.1 on the positive and significant effect of both immigrants and emigrants in promoting
the trade of Spanish provinces finds only partial confirmation in the data. As regards the
immigration side, the hypothesis is strongly confirmed. As shown in Table 2, the Gamma
(and OLS) estimates of the coefficients of ln(Imminit) are positive and significant. Accord-
ing to this specification, increasing the immigrant population by 10% would increase the
trade of Spanish provinces by 1.4%, a higher but comparable estimate than the one found
by Peri and Requena-Silvente [2010] on an earlier time period21. Instead, the coefficient of
ln(Eminit) is not statistically significantly different from zero. Thus, the hypothesis of a
positive role of emigrants in promoting the trade of Spanish provinces proposed by Murat
and Pistoiesi [2009] for the case of Italy does not find empirical support when looking at
the local networks of emigrants. This does not exclude that the flows of information within
the emigrants network be mainly determined at the national level (see below the tests on
geographic proximity).
20An alternative but untestable explanation is that the differences are due to measurement error, which
according to the estimates in Santos-Silva and Tenreyro [2006] would bias the Gamma estimates upward
by 17%. In this case the PPML would be preferable as the bias would only be of 2%. Yet, even taking
into account the possibility that measurement error would upward bias the Gamma estimates upward, the
differences between the PPML and Gamma estimates persist; considering that the confidence intervals of
the very inefficient PPML estimates in some cases do not include the OLS estimates, divergence in the
estimates seem to be more likely to be associated with other forms of functional form mis-specification that
should be further explored
21Similarly to Peri and Requena-Silvente [2010], the coefficient of the no-immigrant dummy (NID) does
not result significantly different from zero in the OLS estimates. Instead, it remains positive and statisti-
cally significant in all specifications of the Poisson and the Gamma model, with comparable or even greater
magnitudes than ln(Imminit). According to this result, the provinces with no immigrants would on average
trade more than the provinces with at least one immigrant. NID assumes frequently the value of 1 by two
main types of countries: those which enjoy particularly favourable fiscal conditions (e.g. Andorra, Luxem-
bourg, Cyprus) and the very remote countries. Because of the smaller distances and closer institutional
settings, the former group is likely to be more represented than the latter in Spanish trade data.
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1.2/1.3 The role of cultural and institutional similarity
The two corollaries of Hp 1.1, that the immigrants’ and emigrants’ effect on the trade of
Spanish provinces is stronger with more institutionally (Hp 1.2) and culturally distant (Hp.
1.3) countries are tested in Tables 8a and 8b.
In table 8a, only the immigrants from extra-EU countries result significant in increasing
the trade of Spanish provinces in the Gamma and OLS estimates. Coherently with the
findings in Table 2, no emigrant variable results statistically to determine the level of
trade. This result is compatible with the idea that the role of immigrants as brokers of the
flow of communication and as facilitators of the enforcement of contracts in international
transactions is stronger with countries that do not share the same institutional setting, i.e.
in this case are non-EU countries. The reason is that sharing the institutional setting or a
regional trade agreement (RTA), as well as a common language, are factors that increase
bilateral trade per se, independently from the immigrant population; the direct effect of
these determinants is absorbed in the fixed effects.This is shown more explicitly in table
9, where the estimated pair-specific fixed effects from the OLS regression (more consistent
than the Gamma estimates of the fixed effects) are regressed on a series of traditional
gravity determinants [Cheng and Wall, 2005]. From this regression, Spain results to trade
on average 20% more with EU countries and countries of the European Economic Area
(EEA), and 63% more with OECD countries.
As regards language commonality, Dlang has a coefficient of 0.975: Spanish provinces trade
about 97.5% more with Spanish-speaking countries, independently from the immigrants
that they host from these countries. In addition to this, the Gamma estimates in table
8b shows that immigrants from Spanish-speaking countries increase trade with their origin
countries to a much greater extent - 82% more - than do the immigrants from non-Spanish
speaking countries. This strongly disconfirms hypothesis 1.3; notice that relying on the OLS
estimates would have led to confirm the hypothesis, even if the magnitude of ln(ImmiSpanit )
estimated by OLS is very similar to the Gamma estimate. This result could be explained
by taking as a reference the random encounter model by Wagner et al. [2002](equation 7):
sharing a common language may give the immigrant easier access to information on trading
opportunities not just in the origin country but also in the host country and increase the
capacity of the immigrant to successfully realize the trading opportunity, i.e. act as a
factor that increases the probability p that an immigrant has the capacity to facilitate the
exchange.
2.1 Sub-national heterogeneity in the multilateral resistance terms
Turning to the hypotheses about sub-national heterogeneity, Table 11 reports the results of
the specifications that omit the province-time effects, but include province income, implying
that the multilateral resistance terms do not vary by province. The point estimates of the
immigration variables are clearly not very sensitive to this change, suggesting that the
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Table 8: Regression results: cultural and institutional similarity
(a) Regression results Hp 1.2 - Institutional similarity: EU countries
Model OLS PPML GammaPML
ln(ImmiEUnit ) 0·123 −0·013 0·080
(0·094) (0·071) (0·051)
ln(ImmiNEUnit ) 0·173∗∗ 0·088 0·155∗∗∗
(0·071) (0·064) (0·038)
ln(EmiEUnit ) 0·001 −0·036 0·036
(0·074) (0·052) (0·046)
ln(EmiNEUnit ) −0·015 0·064∗ −0·004
(0·049) (0·034) (0·029)
NID 0·173 0·228∗∗ 0·211∗∗∗
(0·111) (0·109) (0·065)
NED 0·033 0·077 0·054
(0·069) (0·065) (0·041)
Trading pair effects Yes Yes Yes
Province-time effects Yes Yes Yes
Country-time effects Yes Yes Yes
N 15195 15195 15195
r2 0·119
Standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
(b) Regression results Hp 1.3 - Cultural similarity
Model OLS PPML GammaPML
ln(ImmiSpanit ) 0·234 −0·038 0·235∗∗
(0·216) (0·235) (0·109)
ln(ImmiNSpanit ) 0·156∗∗ 0·049 0·129∗∗∗
(0·064) (0·049) (0·033)
ln(EmiSpanit ) −0·002 0·074 −0·026
(0·056) (0·121) (0·036)
ln(EmiNSpanit ) −0·015 0·029 0·017
(0·055) (0·032) (0·033)
NID 0·173 0·221∗∗ 0·211∗∗∗
(0·113) (0·108) (0·065)
NED 0·027 0·082 0·054
(0·071) (0·063) (0·043)
Trading pair effects Yes Yes Yes
Province-time effects Yes Yes Yes
Country-time effects Yes Yes Yes
N 15195 15195 15195
r2 0·119
Standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 9: Determinants of the fixed effects (OLS estimates)
ln(Yi) 1·292∗∗∗
(0·014)
ln(Yj) 0·642∗∗∗
(0·011)
ln(DIST ) −1·051∗∗∗
(0·030)
Dcolo tie −0·137
(0·150)
Dlang 0·761∗∗∗
(0·148)
Dcommon border 0·890∗∗∗
(0·065)
DEUEEA 0·207∗∗∗
(0·046)
DOECD 0·631∗∗∗
(0·043)
Constant −25·598∗∗∗
(0·340)
N 15195
r2 0·516
Standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Table 10: Joint significance of the province-time effects (Table 2)
Model OLS PPML GammaPML
test F(199, 3038) =1.90 chi2(196) = 1169.52 chi2(206) = 5.2e+05
p-value of the test 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
bilateral immigration effect on trade is not strongly correlated with the average market
access of the host province; this in a way confirms empirically that the immigration effect
acts at the level of the bilateral costs of trade. The estimates for the emigration effect
remain insignificant. As far as the whole of the gravity model is concerned, however,
the province-time effects results jointly highly significantly different from zero with all
estimation methods (table 10); while a likelihood ratio test is not reliable with clustered and
robust standard errors, both the log-likelihood and Akaike information criterion statistics
improve by a greater extent than the reduction in the degrees of freedom when province-
time effects are added to the specifications. Thus, hypothesis 2.1 is fully supported by
the data and the inclusion of the province-time effects is preferred on both theoretical and
practical grounds, even if the practical effect on the variables of interest is minor.
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Table 11: Regression results Hp 2.1 - Sub-national heterogeneity in the multilateral resistance terms
Model OLS PPML GammaPML
ln(Imminit) 0·161∗∗∗ 0·0485 0·126∗∗∗
(0·0611) (0·0535) (0·0319)
ln(Eminit) −0·001 −0·005 0·004
(0·0438) (0·0329) (0·0266)
ln(Yit) 0·384 0·660∗∗∗ 0·306
(0·373) (0·202) (0·205)
NID 0·169 0·173 0·182∗∗∗
(0·110) (0·115) (0·0653)
NED 0·0275 0·0604 0·0355
(0·0694) (0·0686) (0·0411)
N 15195 15195 15195
r2 0·077
log-likelihood −14886·3 −1·71e+07 −143904·7
AIC 30302·6 3·42e+07 294417·3
Trading pair effects Yes Yes Yes
Province-time effects No No No
Country-time effects Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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2.2 Geographic proximity
Table 12 reports the results of the regression which includes both the immigrants from a
given country residing within the province and those residing outside the province. They
confirm the hypothesis that it is local networks of immigrants, rather than more far-reaching
networks, that determine the trade-facilitation effect by immigrants. The flows of infor-
mation relevant to trade creation by emigrants, instead, are to be found at the level of
nation-wide networks of expatriates; as in the specification about language commonality,
the OLS identifies a similar magnitude but not a statistically significant effect. This sug-
gests that the type of information relevant to the trade facilitation effect is quite different
for immigrants and emigrants. Considering that the emigrants’ effects is likely to be asso-
ciated with a taste effect, this result implies that either the information or the tastes - a
distinction between the two is unfortunately impossible with the data at stake - that drive
trade are not province-specific but rather nation-wide. This may also bear implications
with respect to the profile of the migrants able to exert the trade facilitation effect.
Table 12: Regression results Hp 2.2 - Geographic proximity
Model OLS PPML GammaPML
ln(Imminit) 0·154 ∗ ∗ 0·045 0·144∗∗∗
(0·064) (0·048) (0·032)
ln(ImmiOutnit) −1·117 −0·544∗∗∗ −0·082
(1·307) (0·190) (0·065)
ln(Eminit) −0·002 0·013 0·025
(0·051) (0·035) (0·026)
ln(EmiOutnit) 0·524 −0·429 0·279∗∗∗
(0·936) (0·379) (0·057)
NID 0·170 0·218 ∗ ∗ 0·189∗∗∗
(0·112) (0·109) (0·065)
NED 0·034 0·067 0·051
(0·068) (0·062) (0·039)
Constant 14·490 10·635∗∗∗
(14·577) (0·956)
Trading pair effects Yes Yes Yes
Province-time effects Yes Yes Yes
Country-time effects Yes Yes Yes
N 15195 15195 15195
r2 0·119
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
2.3 Sub-national heterogeneity in the immigrants’ effects
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Allowing the elasticity of immigration and emigration to vary by region (i.e. by Comunidad
Autonoma, Hypothesis 2.3 about the heterogeneity in the immigrants and emigrant effects
by region finds strong support. Table 13 shows that Immigrant and emigrant stocks result
significant in only a few regions; according to the Gamma estimates, only in Castilla y Leon,
Cantabria, Catalunia, Extremadura, Galicia, Islas Canarias, Navarra and Region de Murcia
the immigrants are able to exert a positive effect on trade; the magnitude of the effect ranges
from 0.137 to 0.32, with a peak of 0.742 in the Islas canarias. In one case, the Islas Baleares,
the effect is negative but weakly significant. With the exception of the Gamma estimate
for Asturias, the regions where the effect on trade is significant for immigrants do not
find a symmetric effect for emigrants, which result significant only in one region. In table
A.19 in the Appendix, I further address hypothesis 2.3 about subnational heterogeneity on
the immigration and emigration effect on trade by performing province-specific estimates.
Also in this case, and similarly to the findings by Bandyopadhyay et al. [2008] on ethnic
groups, I get that the effect is very heterogeneous across provinces. The immigration effect
results especially significant for the provinces of Almeria, Cordoba, Girona, Las Palmas,
Salamanca and Segovia and its magnitude results much higher - between 0.27 and 0.80
- than the average estimate of 0.17. It is negative and weakly significant in the case of
Bizkaya. This result usefully complements the aggregate information provided in previous
specifications and confirms the importance of focusing on the province level, but should be
taken carefully, considering the smaller number of observations available to estimate each
province-specific immigrant effect (max ca. 500 per province).
3.1 Non-constancy in the migrants’ effects
In tables 14a and 14b, the hypothesis of non-constancy of the elasticity is tested by running
the estimates separately for groups of regions distinguished by their shares of immigrants
and expatriates. In Table 14a provinces are grouped by their total share of immigrants
(low, intermediate, high), and immigrants result having an effect on trade only by inter-
mediate levels of foreign population residing.It is important to notice that the immigration
and emigration shares are calculated on the whole of the migrating population, and not
on a single country group. So high immigration provinces represent provinces where the
overall population of foreigners is comparatively high in relation to the total population
of the province; high expatriation provinces represent provinces which have lost a com-
paratively high portion of their resident population through emigration to any country in
the world. The Gamma estimator shows a non-constant pattern in the migration effect
when differentiated by foreign or expatriates population shares. The effect of immigrants
on trade results stronger by lower shares of the immigrant population and decreases by
increasing shares of foreign population, which may be interpreted as a sign of decreasing
returns from immigration to trade, possibly induced by higher social costs associated with
greater immigrant populations in a country which still has a relatively short experience in
managing immigration.
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Table 13: Regression results Hp 2.3 - Elasticities specific by Comunidades Autonomas
Model OLS PPML Gamma PML
Immigrants Emigrants Immigrants Emigrants Immigrants Emigrants
Arago´n −0·00711 −0·0158 −0·120 0·133 −0·0571 −0·00337
(0·130) (0·147) (0·125) (0·126) (0·0808) (0·102)
Cantabria 0·332 −0·0705 0·0810 0·0992 0·240∗∗ −0·0946
(0·233) (0·169) (0·0929) (0·150) (0·109) (0·104)
Castilla y Leo´n 0·230∗∗ −0·0436 0·0926 −0·259∗ 0·137∗∗ 0·0111
(0·110) (0·125) (0·0798) (0·139) (0·0570) (0·0813)
Castilla-La Mancha 0·0267 0·166 0·0973 0·0560 −0·00496 0·134∗
(0·0813) (0·127) (0·0759) (0·139) (0·0494) (0·0774)
Catalun˜a 0·244∗∗ −0·00782 −0·146∗ 0·0211 0·276∗∗∗ −0·0292
(0·0957) (0·100) (0·0753) (0·0511) (0·0645) (0·0622)
Com. Valenciana −0·0825 −0·0609 0·00851 −0·113∗ −0·0998 −0·0501
(0·104) (0·0701) (0·0799) (0·0623) (0·0674) (0·0439)
Comunidad de Madrid 0·151 −0·0584 0·182∗∗ 0·162 0·137 −0·0393
(0·156) (0·168) (0·0815) (0·107) (0·104) (0·112)
Extremadura 0·265 −0·249 0·202 0·378∗∗ 0·320∗∗∗ −0·257
(0·205) (0·289) (0·141) (0·177) (0·124) (0·162)
Galicia 0·293 −0·0272 0·0274 0·0561 0·268∗∗∗ −0·0686
(0·180) (0·189) (0·0930) (0·0712) (0·0852) (0·103)
Illes Baleares −0·347 0·0591 0·0283 −0·798 −0·444∗ 0·284
(0·334) (0·340) (0·481) (0·504) (0·265) (0·215)
Islas Canarias 0·638 0·269 0·792 0·122 0·742∗∗∗ 0·187
(0·435) (0·324) (0·689) (0·225) (0·238) (0·206)
La Rioja 0·109 −0·000220 0·130 0·0696 0·147 0·000867
(0·334) (0·0390) (0·125) (0·0743) (0·193) (0·0277)
Navarra 0·292 −0·0390 0·501∗∗∗ −0·0586 0·204∗ 0·0360
(0·196) (0·223) (0·184) (0·139) (0·121) (0·147)
Pa´ıs Vasco −0·103 −0·0243 −0·126 0·00161 −0·0927 0·00892
(0·0844) (0·0934) (0·0862) (0·0875) (0·0606) (0·0709)
Principado de Asturias 0·251 −0·127 −0·344∗ 0·766∗∗ 0·137 0·0398
(0·275) (0·195) (0·182) (0·353) (0·146) (0·116)
Regio´n de Murcia 0·161 −0·00736 0·374∗∗∗ −0·0270 0·222∗∗ −0·0218
(0·185) (0·107) (0·0893) (0·0681) (0·110) (0·0675)
NID 0.143 0.162 0.151***
(0.110) (0.106) (0.0656)
NED 0.0252 0.0307 0.0345
(0.0683) (0.0541) (0.0419)
Constant 7.716*** 13.87***
(0.249) (0.216)
N 15195 15195 15195
Standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Looking at table 14b, where the provinces are distinguished by their expatriation rates, the
Gamma estimates, as well as the OLS, suggest that, by low emigration rates, immigrants
do not play a statistically significant role in promoting trade. Instead, the expatriates from
these provinces have a positive effect on trade, with a positive and significant coefficient
of 0.168 in the GammaPML case. In the case of provinces with intermediate shares of
emigrant population, the effect of the expatriates becomes negative and significant in both
the cases of OLS and GammaPML. Immigrants in mid-expatriation provinces, instead,
have a positive and significant role in promoting trade; the magnitude of their effect is
0.18 in the case of Gamma and 0.22 in the case of OLS. The effect of immigrants is even
stronger in high-expatriation provinces: the coefficient is 0.38 in the case of Gamma and
0.44 in the case of OLS. In the same provinces, the effect of emigrants is insignificant in
determining trade.
An explanation for this result which can’t be definitely tested here is that the fact that
provinces today result as high-expatriation provinces are actually mirroring longer-term
dynamics of expatriation. The experience of emigration in the provinces may have created
the social and institutional conditions that are conducive to the economic integration of a
more diverse population and to the access to new markets abroad through enforcement and
information effects, while the long experience in emigration has exhausted the opportunities
available to emigrants, in particular those associated with the ”taste effects”. Notice that
this interpretation is not substitutable with the hypothesis that has been put forward in
the literature (es. ?, that migration ancestry of a given ethnic group affects trade. Because
the provinces are separated by the overall shares of emigrants, the mechanism is probably
to be found at the level of the social sedimentation of the emigration experience. This
explanation would also be compatible with the positive, but less sizeable role played by
immigrants in mid-expatriation provinces and with the positive role played by emigrants in
low expatriation provinces, i.e. where, according to this interpretation, the opportunities
for entering new markets are not yet exhausted. The data do not allow distinguishing
whether this goes through a taste effect, an enforcement or an information effect, but the
first is likely to be important. The negative coefficient of the emigration variables in the
mid expatriation provinces could be explained by the loss of human resources through
emigration which also affects trading opportunities. The results in table 14b could also
explain why, on the aggregate sample, the emigrant population does not result significant
in affecting trade: the effects of the emigrants from low-expatriation provinces are offset by
those of the emigrants in mid-expatriation provinces. Such an effect would logically imply
a similarly negative effect of emigration in high-expatriation country. Indeed, the Gamma
and OLS estimates are negative, while not significant.
Overall, the hypotheses of non-constancy in the immigrants’ and emigrants’ effect on trade
in connection with external factors find strong support in the Gamma estimates. Compar-
ing tables 14a and 14b with the estimates in table 7 above, however, it seems appropriate to
conclude that the non-constancy is due to the interaction of the immigration and emigra-
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tion variables with other factors associated with the characteristics of the location rather
than to non-linearity in functional form of the variables themselves.
6 Conclusions
On the basis of the theoretical microfoundations of the gravity model, in this paper I
identified the necessary ingredients for theory-consistent estimation of the gravity model:
bilateral cost terms that are both pair-specific and time-varying (like immigration and
emigration stocks); and effects at the importer-time, exporter-time and trading pair level.
The practical importance of the inclusion of province-specific multilateral resistance terms
(in this case the province-specific market access in each year) in predicting trade volumes
has been confirmed for this specific dataset with an ad-hoc test.
The theory-consistent specification has been implemented through three estimation meth-
ods, whose consistency and efficiency for the data at stake have been compared on the
basis of the tests proposed in ? and Santos-Silva and Tenreyro [2006]. This procedure
has led to identifying the Gamma PML as the most efficient and consistent estimator for
the data at stake. Throughout the different specifications, the magnitudes of the OLS and
Gamma PML estimates have resulted very close to each other, with the Gamma PML
generally outperforming the OLS in terms of efficiency of the estimates and the OLS es-
timates exceeding those of the Gamma by between 10% and 35%. The Poisson PML has
instead shown a different pattern of systematic non-significance in the estimates and in
many cases estimates that were not comparable with the Gamma and OLS, to an extent
which can hardly be solely explained with its lower efficiency for the data at stake, nor
with the different weights attributed by the estimator to greater trade values. The main
reason for the persisting differences in the estimates seems to be primarily found in func-
tional form mis-specification which is likely to be associated with non-constancy in the
immigration and emigration effects; in particular, non-constancy in the immigration and
emigration effects has been identified across provinces with different overall immigration
and expatriation shares.
Overall, the Gamma and OLS estimators robustly confirm a positive effect of immigrants
on trade. The effect is stronger in provinces with low shares of the foreign population
and it decreases by higher foreign population shares; it is stronger in the trade with more
institutionally distant countries and with Spanish-speaking countries; it shows marked
sub-national variation and appears to be due to localized rather than more far-reaching
networks of immigrants. The networks of expatriates, instead, appear to affect trade
through different mechanisms, with a strong role of nation-wide networks and negligible
effects of the local networks; the effect of emigrants on trade is strong and positive in
provinces with low expatriation levels, but it becomes negative in provinces with higher
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expatriation rates.
References
James E. Anderson. A theoretical foundation for the gravity equation. The American
Economic Review, 69(1):106–116, 1979.
James E. Anderson and Eric van Wincoop. Gravity with gravitas: a solution to the border
puzzle. American Economic Review, 93:170—-92, 2003.
Scott L. Baier and Jeffrey H. Bergstrand. Bonus vetus ols: A simple method for approximat-
ing international trade-cost e?ects using the gravity equation. Journal of International
Economics, 77(1):77–85, 2009.
Richard Baldwin and Daria Taglioni. Gravity for dummies and dummies for grav-
ity equations. NBER working paper series, 2007. Working Paper 12516, url-
http://www.nber.org/papers/w12516.
Subhayu Bandyopadhyay, Cletus C. Coughlin, and Howard J. Wall. Ethnic networks and
us exports. Review of International Economics, 16(1):199–213, 2008.
Ashok Deo Bardhan and Subhrajit Guhathakurta. Global links of subnational regions:
Coastal exports and international networks. Contemporary Economic Policy, 22(225-
236), 2004.
D. Boisso and M. Ferrantino. Economic distance, cultural distance, and openness in in-
ternational trade: Empirical puzzles. Journal of Economic Integration, 12(4):456–484,
1997.
George Borjas. The labor demand curve is downward sloping: Reexamining the impact of
immigration on the labor market. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118(4):1335–1374,
2003.
Herve´ Boulhol and Cle´ment Bosquet. Applying the glm variance assumption to overcome
the scale- dependence of the negative binomial qgpml estimator, 2012.
Massimiliano Bratti, Luca De Benedictis, and Gianluca Santoni. On the pro–trade e?ects
of immigrants, 2012.
Anthony Briant, Pierre-Philippe Combes, and Miren Lafourcade. Product complexity,
quality of institutions and the pro-trade effect of immigrants, 2009.
A. Colin Cameron and Pravin K. Trivedi. Microeconometrics Using Stata. Stata Press,
College Station,TX, 2009.
48
Thomas Chaney. Distorted gravity – heterogeneous firms, market structure and the geog-
raphy of international trade. American Economic Review, 98:1707––21, 2008.
I-Hui Cheng and Howard J. Wall. Controlling for heterogeneity in gravity models of trade
and integration. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, 87:49–63, 2005.
Catherine Co, Patricia Euzent, and Thomas Martin. The export effect of immigration into
the usa. Applied Economics, 36:573–583, 2004.
Pierre-Philippe Combes, Miren Lafourcade, and Thierry Mayer. The trade-creating ef-
fects of business and social networks: evidence from france. Journal of International
Economics, 66:1–29, 2005.
Hein de Haas. Migration transitions: a theoretical and empirical inquiry into the develop-
mental drivers of international migration, 2010. IMI Working Paper No 24, International
Migration Institute, University of Oxford.
James A. Dunlevy. The impact of corruption and language on the pro-trade effect of
immigrants: evidence from the american states. Review of Economics and Statistics, 88
(1):182—-186, 2006.
James A. Dunlevy and William Hutchinson. The impact of immigration on american import
trade in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Journal of Economic History, 59:
1043–62, 1999.
Jonathan Eaton and Samuel Kortum. Technology, geography, and trade. Econometrica,
70(5):1741–1779, 2002.
Jonathan Eaton and Akiko Tamura. Bilateralism and regionalism in japanese and u.s.
trade and direct foreign investment patterns. Journal of the Japanese and International
Economies, 8:478–510, December 1994.
Robert C. Feenstra. Advanced International Trade: Theory and Evidence. Princeton
University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 2004.
S. Flisi and Marina Murat. The hub continent. immigrant networks, emigrant diasporas
and fdi. The Journal of Socio-Economics, 40:796––805, 2011.
Sourafel Girma and Zhihao Yu. The link between immigration and trade: Evidence from
the united kingdom. Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv 138, page 115–30, 2002.
David. M. Gould. Immigrant links to the home country: Empirical implications for u.s.
bilateral trade flows. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 76(2):302–316, May 1994.
Zvi Griliches. Economic data issues. In Z. Griliches and M. D. Intriligator, editors, Hand-
book of Econometrics, volume III. Elsevier Science Publishers BV, Amsterdam, 1986.
49
Luigi Guiso, Paola Sapienza, and Luigi Zingales. Cultural biases in economic exchange?
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, pages 1095–1131, August 2009.
Keith Head and Thierry. Mayer. Gravity equations: Workhorse, toolkit, and cookbook. In
Gita Gopinath, Elhanan Helpman, and Kenneth Rogoff, editors, Handbook of Interna-
tional Economics. Elsevier, 2014.
Keith Head, Thierry Mayer, and John Ries. The erosion of colonial trade linkages after
independence. Journal of International Economics, 81(1):1–14, 2010.
Elhanan Helpman, Marc Melitz, and Yona Rubinstein. Estimating trade flows: Trading
partners and trading volumes. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 123(2):441–487, 2008.
Mark G. Herander and Luz A. Saavedra. Exports and the structure of immigrant-based
networks: The role of geographical proximity. The Review of Economics and Statistics,
87(2):323–335, May 2005.
David Hummels. Toward a geography of trade costs. Mimeo, Krannert School of Manage-
ment, Purdue University, 1999.
Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay, and Pablo Zoido-Lobaton. Governance matters. Policy
Research Working Paper 2196, The World Bank, October 1999.
Willard Manning and John Mullahy. Estimating log models: to transform or not to trans-
form? Journal of health economics, 20(4):461–494, 2001.
Marina Murat and Barbara Pistoiesi. Migrant networks: Empirical implications for the
italian bilateral trade. International Economic Journal, 23(3):371–390., 2009.
Giovanni Peri and Francisco Requena-Silvente. The trade creation effect of immigrants:
Evidence from the remarkable case of spain. Canadian Journal of Economics, 43(4),
2010.
Alejandro Portes and Julia Sensenbrenner. Embeddedness and immigration: Notes on
the social determinants of economic action. American Journal of Sociology, 98:1320–50,
1993.
James L. Powell. Least absolute deviations estimation for the censored regression model.
Journal of Econometrics, 25:303––325, July 1984.
J. B. Ramsey. Tests for specification errors in classical linear least-squares analysis. Journal
of the Royal Statistical Association, 71:350–371, 1969.
James E. Rauch. Networks versus markets in international trade. Journal of International
Economics, 48(1):7–35, 1999.
James E. Rauch. Business and social networks in international trade. Journal of Economic
Literature, 39(4):1177–1203, December 2001.
50
James E. Rauch and Vitor Trinidade. Ethnic chinese networks in international trade.
Review of Economics and Statistics, 84(1):116–30, 2002.
Stephen J. Redding and Anthony J. Venables. Economic geography and international
inequality. Journal of International Economics, 62:53–82, 2004.
J.M.C. Santos-Silva and Silvana Tenreyro. The log of gravity. Review of Economics and
Statistics, 88:641–58, 2006.
Bedassa Tadesse and Roger White. Do immigrants counter the effect of cultural distance
on trade? evidence from us state-level exports. Journal of Socio-Economics, 37(6):
2304–2318, December 2008.
Jan Tinbergen. Shaping the World Economy; Suggestions for an International Economic
Policy. Twentieth Century Fund, New York, 1962.
Don Wagner, Keith Head, and John Ries. Immigration and the trade of provinces. Scottish
Journal of Political Economy, 49(5):507––525, 2002.
Jeffrey Wooldridge. Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data. MIT Press,
Cambridge (MA), 2002.
A Appendix
Table A.17: Total population, immigrants and emigrants by province (2010)
Province Total pop. Spanish Foreigners
Share of immi-
grants over total
popultation
%
immi-
grant
pop. Emigrants
Share of emigrants
over total popula-
tion
% of
emi-
grant
pop.
TOTAL
Spain 47021031 41273297 5747734 0.122 - 1.000 1408825 0.030 - 1.000
Alicante 1926285 1459186 467099 0.242 high 0.081 21371 0.011 low 0.015
Balears 1106049 863793 242256 0.219 high 0.042 14328 0.013 low 0.010
Almer´ıa 695560 544401 151159 0.217 high 0.026 27772 0.040 high 0.020
Girona 753046 590799 162247 0.215 high 0.028 9884 0.013 low 0.007
Tarragona 808420 658106 150314 0.186 high 0.026 10087 0.012 low 0.007
Castello´n 604274 492009 112265 0.186 high 0.020 5267 0.009 low 0.004
Lleida 439768 359278 80490 0.183 high 0.014 11471 0.026 mid 0.008
Ma´laga 1609557 1334530 275027 0.171 high 0.048 33211 0.021 mid 0.024
Madrid 6458684 5378740 1079944 0.167 high 0.188 174819 0.027 mid 0.124
Murcia 1461979 1220114 241865 0.165 high 0.042 19607 0.013 mid 0.014
Guadalajara 251563 212359 39204 0.156 high 0.007 2247 0.009 low 0.002
S.C.Tenerife 1027914 874587 153327 0.149 high 0.027 72454 0.070 high 0.051
Barcelona 5511147 4705660 805487 0.146 high 0.140 104302 0.019 mid 0.074
LaRioja 322415 275735 46680 0.145 high 0.008 10237 0.032 mid 0.007
LasPalmas 1090605 936553 154052 0.141 mid 0.027 25548 0.023 mid 0.018
Zaragoza 973252 845610 127642 0.131 mid 0.022 15388 0.016 mid 0.011
Cuenca 217716 189747 27969 0.128 mid 0.005 2269 0.010 low 0.002
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Segovia 164268 143194 21074 0.128 mid 0.004 2304 0.014 mid 0.002
Valencia 2581147 2266752 314395 0.122 mid 0.055 36944 0.014 mid 0.026
Huesca 228566 200756 27810 0.122 mid 0.005 5063 0.022 mid 0.004
Teruel 145277 127643 17634 0.121 mid 0.003 3656 0.025 mid 0.003
Toledo 697959 613984 83975 0.120 mid 0.015 6627 0.009 low 0.005
Melilla 76034 67161 8873 0.117 mid 0.002 3527 0.046 high 0.003
Navarra 636924 565555 71369 0.112 mid 0.012 16766 0.026 mid 0.012
Soria 95258 85388 9870 0.104 mid 0.002 4421 0.046 high 0.003
Burgos 374826 340260 34566 0.092 mid 0.006 12122 0.032 mid 0.009
Araba/A´lava 317352 289142 28210 0.089 mid 0.005 4139 0.013 low 0.003
C. Real 529453 483452 46001 0.087 mid 0.008 4175 0.008 low 0.003
Huelva 518081 475328 42753 0.083 mid 0.007 5200 0.010 low 0.004
Albacete 401682 369277 32405 0.081 mid 0.006 5129 0.013 low 0.004
A´vila 171896 159283 12613 0.073 mid 0.002 6005 0.035 mid 0.004
Granada 918072 853738 64334 0.070 mid 0.011 34317 0.037 high 0.024
Cantabria 592250 553049 39201 0.066 mid 0.007 25170 0.042 high 0.018
Valladolid 533640 500984 32656 0.061 mid 0.006 9005 0.017 mid 0.006
Gipuzkoa 707263 664814 42449 0.060 mid 0.007 19313 0.027 mid 0.014
Bizkaia 1153724 1085014 68710 0.060 mid 0.012 27011 0.023 mid 0.019
Leo´n 499284 473321 25963 0.052 mid 0.005 35339 0.071 high 0.025
Ourense 335219 318508 16711 0.050 mid 0.003 82134 0.245 high 0.058
Ceuta 80579 76584 3995 0.050 low 0.001 2132 0.026 mid 0.002
Salamanca 353619 336113 17506 0.050 low 0.003 23265 0.066 high 0.017
Asturias 1084341 1035055 49286 0.045 low 0.009 83041 0.077 high 0.059
Palencia 172510 165301 7209 0.042 low 0.001 5510 0.032 mid 0.004
Zamora 194214 186173 8041 0.041 low 0.001 14820 0.076 high 0.011
Pontevedra 962472 922678 39794 0.041 low 0.007 106279 0.110 high 0.075
Sevilla 1917097 1840007 77090 0.040 low 0.013 22326 0.012 low 0.016
Lugo 353504 339328 14176 0.040 low 0.002 50352 0.142 high 0.036
Ca´diz 1236739 1188972 47767 0.039 low 0.008 19825 0.016 mid 0.014
Ca´ceres 415083 399767 15316 0.037 low 0.003 12705 0.031 mid 0.009
Badajoz 692137 668097 24040 0.035 low 0.004 8803 0.013 low 0.006
ACorun˜a 1146458 1107469 38989 0.034 low 0.007 128090 0.112 high 0.091
Co´rdoba 805108 779849 25259 0.031 low 0.004 13920 0.017 mid 0.010
Jae´n 670761 650094 20667 0.031 low 0.004 9128 0.014 mid 0.006
Table A.19: Regression results Hp 2.2 - Province-specific elasticities
Province OLS OLS2 PPML PPML2 GammaPML GammaPML2
Immigrants
Albacete -0.197 -0.142 0.042 -0.174 -0.214** -0.187
(0.137) (0.182) (0.161) (0.168) (0.095) (0.116)
Alicante -0.117 -0.006 0.094 0.237 -0.109 -0.014
(0.155) (0.188) (0.126) (0.279) (0.089) (0.118)
Almeria 0.570** 0.504 0.479*** 0.350** 0.494*** 0.389*
(0.268) (0.393) (0.095) (0.146) (0.157) (0.218)
Asturias 0.254 0.118 -0.334* -0.214 0.141 0.003
(0.275) (0.254) (0.176) (0.235) (0.146) (0.170)
Avila -0.297 0.783 -0.430** -0.316 -0.951** 0.279
(0.728) (0.878) (0.183) (0.392) (0.423) (0.623)
Badajoz 0.196 -0.397 0.284 -0.547* 0.306** -0.319*
(0.277) (0.315) (0.175) (0.313) (0.154) (0.190)
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Islas Baleares -0.341 0.212 0.047 0.852 -0.436 0.183
(0.336) (0.541) (0.480) (0.654) (0.265) (0.369)
Barcelona -0.195 0.005 -0.209** 0.123 -0.223** -0.025
(0.149) (0.167) (0.092) (0.114) (0.090) (0.105)
Burgos 0.167 0.222 0.228*** 0.244* 0.149** 0.179*
(0.106) (0.165) (0.088) (0.126) (0.068) (0.092)
Caceres 0.338 0.180 0.217* 0.246 0.352* 0.248
(0.304) (0.310) (0.117) (0.197) (0.193) (0.217)
Cadiz -0.414 0.153 -0.273* -0.014 -0.352** 0.311
(0.255) (0.324) (0.158) (0.206) (0.140) (0.210)
Cantabria 0.345 0.333 0.099 0.161 0.248** 0.269*
(0.233) (0.277) (0.092) (0.117) (0.109) (0.150)
Castellon 0.038 0.180 0.050 0.283 -0.006 0.126
(0.150) (0.146) (0.125) (0.200) (0.114) (0.119)
Ciudad Real 0.181 0.121 0.291** 0.192* 0.171* 0.111
(0.149) (0.165) (0.114) (0.107) (0.092) (0.102)
Cordoba 0.279* 0.225 0.231 0.162 0.283*** 0.235**
(0.157) (0.172) (0.221) (0.326) (0.093) (0.110)
A Coruna 0.182 0.177 0.185 0.087 0.192 0.274
(0.168) (0.270) (0.126) (0.179) (0.118) (0.175)
Cuenca 0.239 0.022 0.644** -0.047 0.222* -0.015
(0.201) (0.201) (0.257) (0.197) (0.134) (0.142)
Girona 0.519*** 0.429** 0.163 0.336* 0.555*** 0.463***
(0.172) (0.212) (0.150) (0.187) (0.110) (0.135)
Granada 0.159 0.079 -0.079 0.065 0.130 0.114
(0.262) (0.298) (0.297) (0.424) (0.168) (0.199)
Guadalajara 0.061 -0.178 0.133 0.333 0.012 -0.147
(0.150) (0.190) (0.153) (0.228) (0.092) (0.120)
Guipuzcoa -0.016 -0.092 -0.107 0.014 -0.034 -0.127
(0.155) (0.161) (0.132) (0.159) (0.109) (0.128)
Huelva 0.042 0.122 0.349* -0.042 0.014 -0.005
(0.257) (0.409) (0.186) (0.194) (0.157) (0.263)
Huesca 0.036 0.087 0.536* 0.518 -0.001 0.030
(0.210) (0.227) (0.291) (0.407) (0.144) (0.158)
Jaen 0.277 0.578*** 0.033 0.184 0.254* 0.587***
(0.221) (0.221) (0.278) (0.448) (0.130) (0.131)
La Rioja 0.128 -0.002 0.154 -0.041 0.170 -0.007
(0.336) (0.360) (0.125) (0.111) (0.195) (0.202)
Leon 0.121 0.113 0.612** 0.650** 0.096 0.223
(0.283) (0.317) (0.280) (0.279) (0.197) (0.223)
Lleida 0.224 -0.035 0.264** -0.071 0.188** -0.070
(0.147) (0.178) (0.110) (0.154) (0.094) (0.116)
Lugo 0.297 0.226 0.023 -0.576** 0.360** 0.253
(0.249) (0.307) (0.162) (0.244) (0.161) (0.185)
Madrid 0.161 0.398 0.207** 0.058 0.140 0.425**
(0.159) (0.261) (0.083) (0.178) (0.105) (0.173)
Malaga -0.033 -0.136 0.389 -0.077 -0.090 -0.139
(0.240) (0.329) (0.297) (0.305) (0.177) (0.237)
Murcia 0.166 0.224 0.395*** 0.432*** 0.225** 0.315**
(0.187) (0.218) (0.091) (0.124) (0.110) (0.138)
Navarra 0.309 0.312 0.523*** 0.341* 0.216* 0.162
(0.196) (0.203) (0.184) (0.197) (0.121) (0.128)
Ourense 0.582 0.458 0.415 0.858** 0.446** 0.291
(0.460) (0.572) (0.363) (0.412) (0.192) (0.224)
Palencia 0.208 0.243 0.326** 0.001 0.143 0.210*
(0.218) (0.251) (0.157) (0.097) (0.114) (0.121)
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Las Palmas 0.802** 0.125 1.392* 1.915 0.912*** 0.351
(0.385) (0.452) (0.723) (1.331) (0.293) (0.361)
Pontevedra -0.021 -0.018 -0.112 0.071 -0.030 -0.048
(0.227) (0.268) (0.117) (0.235) (0.169) (0.212)
Salamanca 0.635* 0.389 0.579** -0.340 0.583*** 0.423*
(0.367) (0.404) (0.230) (0.287) (0.192) (0.221)
S.C. Tenerife 0.524 -0.385 -0.973 1.788 0.581 0.166
(0.814) (0.919) (1.546) (1.715) (0.385) (0.430)
Segovia 0.677** 0.789** 0.376*** 0.289* 0.494*** 0.614***
(0.283) (0.314) (0.090) (0.162) (0.133) (0.160)
Sevilla -0.079 -0.447* 0.170 -0.412** -0.088 -0.466***
(0.200) (0.237) (0.178) (0.179) (0.128) (0.147)
Soria 0.212 0.651** -0.049 0.179 0.162 0.479***
(0.302) (0.291) (0.161) (0.244) (0.137) (0.143)
Tarragona 0.284 0.142 0.130 0.297 0.406*** 0.317
(0.182) (0.264) (0.102) (0.184) (0.133) (0.204)
Teruel 0.031 0.076 -0.101 -0.206 -0.057 -0.102
(0.218) (0.239) (0.105) (0.153) (0.133) (0.139)
Toledo -0.157 0.036 -0.203 0.089 -0.186* -0.014
(0.185) (0.186) (0.128) (0.224) (0.111) (0.130)
Valencia -0.222 -0.042 0.040 0.333** -0.207** -0.027
(0.159) (0.171) (0.103) (0.163) (0.094) (0.122)
Valladolid 0.245 0.319 -0.163 -0.062 0.137 0.228
(0.231) (0.322) (0.199) (0.289) (0.125) (0.163)
Vizcaya -0.272* -0.140 -0.147 -0.050 -0.226* -0.119
(0.161) (0.145) (0.149) (0.174) (0.123) (0.123)
Zamora -0.106 -0.171 0.122 -0.438** -0.120 -0.179
(0.291) (0.330) (0.172) (0.186) (0.188) (0.211)
Zaragoza -0.026 -0.219 -0.171 -0.305** -0.019 -0.186
(0.195) (0.248) (0.110) (0.138) (0.117) (0.149)
Emigrants
Albacete 0.146 0.204 0.256 0.273 0.153 0.212*
(0.202) (0.209) (0.217) (0.233) (0.123) (0.124)
Alicante 0.091 0.140* 0.006 0.044 0.109** 0.153***
(0.064) (0.072) (0.077) (0.068) (0.047) (0.054)
Almeria 0.680*** 0.670*** 0.509*** 0.488*** 0.614*** 0.599***
(0.263) (0.237) (0.133) (0.134) (0.163) (0.159)
Asturias -0.112 -0.161 0.771** 0.714** 0.052 -0.022
(0.193) (0.207) (0.352) (0.343) (0.115) (0.131)
Avila -0.347 -0.346 -0.162 -0.124 -0.200 -0.198
(0.583) (0.594) (0.192) (0.232) (0.409) (0.416)
Badajoz -0.352 -0.741 0.615*** 0.387** -0.323 -0.684***
(0.472) (0.469) (0.184) (0.190) (0.240) (0.244)
Islas Baleares 0.090 0.295 -0.807 -0.539 0.309 0.495**
(0.342) (0.317) (0.503) (0.463) (0.216) (0.221)
Barcelona -0.013 0.083 0.019 0.109* 0.012 0.112*
(0.101) (0.102) (0.060) (0.056) (0.064) (0.068)
Burgos 0.124 0.146 0.000 0.006 0.155 0.165
(0.180) (0.185) (0.119) (0.114) (0.119) (0.119)
Caceres -0.081 -0.240 -0.131 -0.224 -0.136 -0.223
(0.325) (0.342) (0.173) (0.212) (0.213) (0.227)
Cadiz -0.473** -0.272 -0.439** -0.478** -0.583*** -0.321*
(0.236) (0.217) (0.185) (0.188) (0.170) (0.170)
Cantabria -0.044 -0.050 0.105 0.077 -0.077 -0.065
(0.169) (0.172) (0.150) (0.150) (0.104) (0.103)
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Castellon -0.031 0.119 -0.045 0.040 -0.065 0.091
(0.103) (0.112) (0.075) (0.084) (0.066) (0.076)
Ciudad Real 0.071 -0.005 -0.058 -0.040 0.051 -0.010
(0.221) (0.229) (0.261) (0.313) (0.139) (0.144)
Cordoba 0.139 0.045 -0.052 -0.077 0.083 -0.007
(0.201) (0.239) (0.206) (0.228) (0.132) (0.147)
A Coruna 0.087 0.064 -0.166 -0.210 0.092 0.123
(0.261) (0.255) (0.259) (0.274) (0.183) (0.187)
Cuenca 0.284 0.039 0.269 0.191 0.354* 0.122
(0.365) (0.349) (0.282) (0.251) (0.214) (0.205)
Girona -0.060 -0.075 0.030 0.056 -0.092 -0.100
(0.163) (0.162) (0.109) (0.124) (0.113) (0.117)
Granada 0.196 0.212 0.008 0.149 0.162 0.240*
(0.193) (0.204) (0.259) (0.310) (0.139) (0.141)
Guadalajara 0.214 0.103 -0.203 -0.159 -0.085 -0.182
(0.302) (0.305) (0.250) (0.286) (0.182) (0.181)
Guipuzcoa 0.009 0.022 0.052 0.222 0.037 0.065
(0.174) (0.216) (0.209) (0.193) (0.128) (0.134)
Huelva 0.028 0.088 0.017 -0.459* 0.129 0.070
(0.479) (0.471) (0.339) (0.263) (0.303) (0.339)
Huesca 0.118 0.101 -0.405* -0.514* 0.069 0.051
(0.254) (0.261) (0.245) (0.288) (0.182) (0.187)
Jaen -0.280 -0.016 0.210 0.197 -0.172 0.144
(0.436) (0.386) (0.407) (0.415) (0.228) (0.201)
La Rioja 0.005 -0.017 0.074 0.024 0.005 -0.020
(0.039) (0.045) (0.074) (0.061) (0.028) (0.031)
Leon 0.558** 0.565** 0.559 0.493 0.837*** 0.852***
(0.270) (0.268) (0.470) (0.509) (0.234) (0.217)
Lleida 0.351* 0.222 0.156 -0.004 0.337*** 0.219*
(0.206) (0.205) (0.182) (0.171) (0.130) (0.130)
Lugo -0.200 -0.185 0.353 0.336 -0.406 -0.368
(0.453) (0.430) (0.422) (0.402) (0.261) (0.259)
Madrid -0.045 0.054 0.154 0.094 -0.024 0.100
(0.166) (0.195) (0.108) (0.106) (0.110) (0.119)
Malaga -0.035 -0.068 -0.087 -0.363** -0.020 -0.032
(0.167) (0.193) (0.214) (0.177) (0.122) (0.134)
Murcia 0.014 0.040 -0.024 -0.031 -0.007 0.034
(0.108) (0.117) (0.068) (0.074) (0.067) (0.071)
Navarra -0.013 -0.038 -0.050 -0.200 0.060 -0.002
(0.224) (0.254) (0.137) (0.146) (0.148) (0.169)
Ourense 0.364 0.175 -0.335 -0.348 0.353 0.185
(0.543) (0.505) (0.534) (0.457) (0.301) (0.298)
Palencia -0.356 -0.436 -0.019 -0.139 -0.267 -0.360
(0.362) (0.362) (0.195) (0.201) (0.232) (0.233)
Las Palmas 0.084 -0.266 0.242 0.390 -0.020 -0.315
(0.380) (0.393) (0.454) (0.508) (0.272) (0.331)
Pontevedra -0.138 -0.172 0.111* 0.119 -0.090 -0.146
(0.184) (0.178) (0.063) (0.081) (0.132) (0.140)
Salamanca 0.028 -0.122 0.761* 0.712 0.013 -0.026
(0.330) (0.340) (0.416) (0.441) (0.261) (0.262)
S. C. Tenerife 0.438 -0.031 -0.055 0.555 0.386 0.066
(0.478) (0.485) (0.216) (0.557) (0.292) (0.356)
Segovia -0.257 -0.266 -0.121 -0.124 -0.258 -0.326
(0.490) (0.492) (0.236) (0.239) (0.226) (0.225)
Sevilla 0.097 -0.051 0.366 0.174 0.048 -0.096
(0.274) (0.263) (0.312) (0.209) (0.166) (0.160)
Continued. . .
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Soria 0.186 0.628* 0.232 0.539 0.281 0.677***
(0.356) (0.329) (0.318) (0.409) (0.228) (0.226)
Tarragona -0.042 -0.112 0.105 0.139 -0.094 -0.127
(0.199) (0.192) (0.179) (0.176) (0.124) (0.125)
Teruel 0.025 0.012 0.078 0.059 0.113 0.094
(0.408) (0.364) (0.567) (0.584) (0.293) (0.287)
Toledo 0.374 0.416 0.064 0.109 0.427*** 0.473***
(0.271) (0.280) (0.311) (0.267) (0.161) (0.160)
Valencia -0.251 -0.128 -0.348** -0.373** -0.213** -0.093
(0.179) (0.192) (0.151) (0.151) (0.099) (0.109)
Valladolid -0.155 -0.096 -0.321*** -0.337*** -0.189 -0.139
(0.176) (0.236) (0.106) (0.106) (0.124) (0.137)
Vizcaya 0.135 0.210 -0.095 -0.088 0.141 0.195
(0.180) (0.194) (0.161) (0.165) (0.138) (0.149)
Zamora -0.606 -0.722 0.902 0.793 -0.239 -0.356
(0.465) (0.444) (1.045) (0.857) (0.384) (0.395)
Zaragoza -0.095 -0.181 0.200 0.173 -0.090 -0.146
(0.117) (0.135) (0.125) (0.121) (0.097) (0.105)
NID 0.191* 0.219* 0.284*** 0.218** 0.201*** 0.221***
(0.114) (0.116) (0.097) (0.106) (0.068) (0.069)
NED 0.078 0.070 0.041 0.030 0.073* 0.078*
(0.072) (0.071) (0.057) (0.056) (0.044) (0.043)
Constant 7.622*** 7.842*** 13.665*** 13.693***
(0.309) (0.333) (0.071) (0.060)
Country-time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province-time effects No Yes No Yes No Yes
Pair effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 15195 15195 15195 15195 15195 15195
r2 0.091 0.130
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Table A.18: Top origin and destination countries in 2010
A.Immigration: Top 15 origin countries, 2010
Country Immigrants Gender ratio Age ratio
Education ra-
tio
Employment
ratio
Duration-of-
stay ratio
1.Romania 831235 .6897932 3.179868 .6057692 1.987028 3.252971
2.Morocco 754080 .620505 2.894016 .2727942 1.183971 .6356112
3.Ecuador 399586 1.053598 2.514053 .538374 2.236376 3.031104
4.UK 387677 1.042696 2.351648 .9857143 .5566188 .4882227
5.Colombia 292641 1.478411 3.311899 .8573672 1.248511 2.234731
6.Bolivia 213169 1.15331 3.065789 1.063973 1.288889 1.586498
7. Germany 195824 1.083444 3.497498 1.148885 .7541121 .2828179
8. Italy 184277 .5826446 3.807531 1.371849 .9947917 .5593923
9. Bulgaria 169552 .7585185 3.844898 .6437588 1.75406 2.184783
10. China 158244 .803681 3.083333 .4401973 1.654628 .7176471
11. Portugal 142520 1.068939 3.193093 .1971067 .8730716 .1649802
12. Peru 140182 1.4389 4.543982 1.68623 1.424089 .7410388
13. Argentina 132249 1.054078 2.606226 1.480842 .9503367 .4862593
14. Francia 123870 1.168254 3.368023 .9148555 1.09919 .1192647
15. Brazil 117808 1.859375 3.318584 .9729364 .9972715 .5711207
B.Emigration: Top 15 destination countries, 2010
Country Immigrants Gender ratio Age ratio
Education ra-
tio
Employment
ratio
Duration-of-
stay ratio
1. Argentinaf 309523 1.159566122 0.991431207 - - -
2. France 164854 1.231658 1.273929 .4695855 .5418145 .0352967
3. Venezuelaf 139830 0.999325454 1.229308346 - - -
4. Germany 85700 .6560102 2.6108f .4018945 - -
5. Brazilf 80285 0.938242526 1.208772085 - - -
6. Switzerland 73277 .9812543 5.052161 .5997626 2.558361 .087425
7. Mexico 70173 .8634261 1.389786 2.071969 .9472904 -
8. Cubaf 70106 1.301930085 0.455867289 - - -
9. USA 57678 1.277718 2.638894 2.088229 .9939255 .2016603
10. UK 50727 1.477968 2.502992 2.316668 1.756874 -
11. Uruguayf 49422 1.160277815 1.057324571 - - -
12. Belgium 36222 1.141806 2.681823 .2854206 .6084685 .1230672
13. Chilef 33056 1.057610844 1.165552088 - - -
14. Andorraf 21319 1.019035178 3.021933086 - - -
15. Netherlands 15262 1.087178 3.344953613f 1.369096 - -
Age ratio = Persons aged 25-64
(Persons aged 15-24)+(Persons aged 65+)
; Education ratio =
(ISCED codes 3 to 6
(ISCED codes 0-2)
; Employment ratio =
(Employed)
(Unemployed)+(Inactive)
; Duration-of-stay ratio = stays≤5years
stays>5years
. Source: Own elaboration on INE and OECD-DIOC
data.
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